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SUMMARY 
This research is aimed at analysing the nature, extent and cause of smuggling at 
selected Correctional Centres in Gauteng with the aim to provide appropriate 
strategies to combat smuggling. 
 
Smuggling is seen as a chain of command that reflects predisposition of an 
organised crime. 
 
Smuggling in correctional centres is an ongoing concern. Unauthorised items that 
are smuggled into the correctional centres have an adverse effect into the lives of 
people and death is an ultimate price. The Department of Correctional Services is 
also experiencing a severe shortage of officials due to The Seven Days 
Establishment and the Occupation Specific Dispensation (OSD) policies of Centre- 
Based and Non-Centre- Based staff. 
. 
The study shows an increase of smuggling of items such as dangerous weapons, 
dagga, cellular phones and sim card over a three-year period at the three 
Correctional Centres. Various recommendations are made to combat smuggling in 
correctional centres including going back to the basics of proper searching of 
visitors, offenders, cells and staff when entering the facilities. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Smuggling can be classified as an organised crime because multiple tasks and 
people are involved in this operation of trafficking unauthorised items into corretional 
centres. Smuggling operation involves more specialised tasks which are the 
transportation plan, recruitment plan, procument plan of unauthorised items to be 
smuggled, bribing security officials and payment of stashers. For dagga to be 
smuggled into a correctional centre, dagga must be sourced from a reliable supplier 
who from time to time must supply a large quantity, another person would transport 
the merchandise from the supplier to the next person who would wrap up the dagga 
in a very convenient way for it to be concealed. The next person would usually be an 
offender who would recruit a corrupt correctional official to turn a blind eye in 
assisting the dagga to go through the security check points without any hinderence, 
the offender would also employ other offenders as runners who would be responsible 
for selling dagga inside the correctional centre. 
 
Smuggling involves a chain of command regardless of where it is conducted. This 
sentiment is shared by Morselli (2014:118) and Williams (1959:256), who clearly 
articulated the definition of smuggling as transportation of illegal goods or any item 
through the restricted area, excluding amongst others, international borders, 
correctional centres and any building or space. But the researcher in this study 
concentrated on smuggling into the correctional centres. Correctional centres are like 
an ocean that is relatively silent on the outside but when one goes deeper into an 
ocean one would realise that there is life and inexplicable activities happening inside 
the ocean. For the mere fact that people are born free, because of their failure to 
abide by the approved regulated ways of doing things, they find themselves behind 
bars, confined to a controlled environment where the authorities try to rehabilitate 
them into law abiding citizens. It is rather disheartening to realise that most of the 
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offenders, correctional officials, and the public continue to smuggle unauthorised 
items into the correctional centres. This phenomenon is wildly experienced around 
the world and also in South African correctional centres (Clarke, M. 2013.). 
 
According to Hardman (2007:08) and others (www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic 
figures/howard john.shtml) John Howard, a philanthropist born 2 September 1726 in 
Clapton, London discovered that correctional officials during those years were not 
salaried but lived on fees paid by offenders for food, bedding, release and other 
favours. Poor offenders lived in appalling conditions, many correctional officials 
demanded payment before offenders were released, and this resulted in poor 
offenders staying in correctional centres even if they have fully served the duration of 
their sentence. In 1774 Howard reformed correctional centres by regulating the 
correctional system, it is disheartening to realise that after 239 years, Howard’s 
untiring search to have a stable security and order in the correctional system, 
correctional centres today, are currently experiencing incidents of smuggling that are 
destroying the mission and objectives of the correctional systems around the world. 
 
Since the introduction of a democratic government and subsequent introduction of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa in 1994 and 1996 respectively,and 
the amended Correctional Services Act (Act 111 of 1998) the Department of 
Correctional Services has introduced a management approach where human rights 
are reinforced and where offenders are motivated and encouraged to do away with 
negative values and encouraged to stick to the values which are positive and 
acceptable to the general public. Nevertheless, we see many unauthorised items 
smuggled into the correctional centres. Unauthorised items smuggled into the 
correctional centre range from Fire-arms, bullets, Other dangerous weapons (knives, 
self-made knives, pieces of steel, blocks of sunlight soap in socks, padlock on a 
rope), explosives , nyaope, mandrax, dagga - bank size, dagga – blades, dagga – 
kilograms, cellular phones, cellular chargers, SIM cards, bankcards, cash, etc. 
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Offenders have creative methods of hiding unauthorised items. Correctional officials 
have found items concealed under mattresses, concealed under the wrist watches, 
contained inside the body cavity, cereals containers, false bottom boxes, hollowed 
out books, toilets, televisions, radios, lights fixtures, sweeping brooms and many 
more. Visitors, offenders and corrupt correctional officials smuggle related 
paraphernalia’s into correctional centres. 
 
There is a strong need to investigate smuggling in correctional centres as an on-
going concern. 
 
Unauthorised items smuggled into the correctional centres have affected the lives of 
offenders, correctional officials and the South African public. Smuggling is as old as 
the correctional system and in many instances it has a detrimental effect to the life of 
people and the correctional system. From this scourge we saw a Head Correctional 
Centre and an Area Coordinator shot and killed by offenders with an alleged 
smuggled firearm in an attempted escape. This research is intended to generate 
information on the nature, extent and causes of smuggling in correctional centres 
and to make recommendations that will assist in combating smuggling. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This research topic touches an interesting and a wildly occurrence rather than a 
more narrowly defined problem. It arises from the problems that have been 
experienced for many years in correctional centres around the world. The causes of 
smuggling in correctional centres are presumed to be gangsterism, overcrowding, 
non-compliance with policies by correctional officials, offenders and members of the 
public. The revelations of The Jali Commission (2006:1205) stated the following 
“This malady of smuggling in the correctional centres which filters into the 
Department of Correctional Services also causes the environment to become 
industrious for the operation of gangs inside the Correctional Centre walls. The 
gangs which had always operated covertly within the Correctional system are now 
operating openly. He also believed that some correctional officers are members of 
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correctional centre gangs”. He also mentioned that gangs are a powerful force in 
correctional centres and they play a significant role in smuggling and that gangs are 
everlasting threat to the functioning of the correctional centres. The commission 
further mentioned that correctional officials took bribes to turn a blind eye on 
smugglings. Some of the officials of the department were even seeking the aid of the 
gangs for their own benefit, and this renders correctional centres uncontrollable. 
 
1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this research is to analyse the nature, extent and cause of smuggling 
at selected correctional centres in Gauteng with the aim to endow appropriate 
strategies which may contribute towards the prevention of smuggling in correctional 
centres. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this research are: 
 To describe the nature, extent and causes of the phenomenon of smuggling 
at selected correctional centres in Gauteng. 
 To make recommendations that may contribute to the prevention of 
smuggling in correctional centres. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 
 To conduct a literature review on the phenomenon of smuggling in 
correctional centres nationally and internationally. 
 Describe and explain the South African legislation and the Department of 
Correctional Services’ policies and procedures with regards to smuggling. 
 To analyse information on confiscated items that have been reported to the 
department where smuggling has been an element. 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT 
SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG. 
 
5 
 
1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question for this study is “What are the nature, extent and 
causes of smuggling at correctional centres”? 
In answering the primary research question, data was collected and analysed aimed 
at answering to the following secondary research questions: 
 What is the range of unauthorised items involved in smuggling within a 
correctional centre? 
 What are the security risks involved in smuggling? 
 How many unauthorised items  were smuggled into the selected correctional 
centres for the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15  
 Which unauthorised items are most commonly involved during smuggling in a 
correctional Centre? 
 What are the trends in the type of unauthorised items smuggled – is there a 
growth in certain unauthorised items such as smuggling with cellular phones? 
 
1.7 DESCRIPTION OF KEY CONCEPTS 
In this section we will describe the key concept relevant to the study with a view to 
give a basis for understanding of this phenomenon of smuggling. 
 
1.7.1 UNAUTHORISED ITEMS 
Are also referred to as contrabands, are anything introduced or found in correctional 
centres that are not permitted by the Correctional Services Act (Act 111 of 1998). 
 
1.7.2 SMUGGLING 
Is a clandestine transportation of unauthorised items past a security check area 
(main gates and all the gates inside the correctional centre are security check areas 
where searching and confiscation of unauthorised items takes place). Smuggling is 
an unauthorised delivery of unauthorised items through security check points into a 
correctional centre in violation of applicable laws or regulations. 
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1.7.3 OFFENDER 
Is a person who is sentenced by the courts to serve a determined sentence and also 
includes remand detainees still awaiting trial or any person housed in the 
correctional centre or housed by the service providers of the Department of 
Correctional Services. 
 
1.7.4 SERVICE PROVIDERS 
Are people who are rendering services to the correctional centre or Department of 
Correctional Services. 
 
1.7.5 SEARCHING 
Is an action employed in examining carefully or thoroughly and removing any 
unauthorised item from a person or place. 
 
1.7.6 MOVEMENT OF OFFENDERS 
Any movement of an offender from his cell out of his/her unit must at all time be 
controlled and monitored, if the movement is not controlled and monitored it may 
promote smuggling of unauthorised items. 
 
1.7.7 SECURITY 
Security is defined as protection from harm of vulnerable people and valuable 
assets. It also includes the seizure and removal of unauthorised items from 
correctional centres. 
 
1.7.8 CORRECTIONAL CENTRE 
Correctional centre is established by Correctional Service Act (Act No 111 of 1998), 
is a place where offenders are housed, trained, detained, rehabilitated and taken 
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care of under protective custody. This also includes offenders in public hospitals, 
offenders in court and offenders in transit to other facilities. 
 
1.7.9 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES 
Department of Correctional Services is established by section 7(2) of the Public 
Service Act, and is part of the Public Service. It is also established by section 197 of 
the Constitution. Department of Correctional Services must act in accordance with 
the purpose of the correctional system in terms of this Act it must as far as 
practicable, be self-sufficient and operate according to business principles and 
perform all work necessary for its effective management. This view is clearly 
narrated by Correctional Services Act, 111 of 1998. 
 
1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Recommendations from this study can lead to an improvement of security and the 
reduction of smuggling in Department of Correctional Services. The study also adds 
to the body of knowledge in the field of smuggling at correctional centres. This can 
contribute to address challenges experienced with smuggling in correctional centres. 
 
1.9 DELINEATION 
In this research the researcher focused on smuggling at selected correctional 
centres in Gauteng which are Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detainees (RD) 
Correctional Centre, Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre, and 
Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre. The three correctional centres are 
primarily selected because they are the larger correctional centres in the Gauteng 
region. 
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1.10 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.10.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research design is used as a strategic framework that is a bridge between research 
questions and completing of the entire research (Blanche, Durrheim and Painter 
2006:34). Welman and Kruger (2002:46) also deduced that research design is a plan 
on how the researcher would conduct the research. This includes, research 
methods, research problem, research questions and the significance of the study. 
Research Methodology then would follow and focuses on with the target population, 
sampling method, data collection tools, data analysis and ethical consideration. This 
plan would help the researcher to draw conclusion and finding of this research and 
its validity. Henning (2004:15) states that design is the procedure used to collect 
analyse data and the selection of participants. Stewart and Shamdsani (1990:13). A 
descriptive approach of the phenomena of smuggling in correctional centres was 
followed in this study. The study included a thorough literature review on the topic 
followed by empirical research in terms of the analysis of the nature and extent of 
confiscated unauthorised items were smuggling was involved. The study also 
included a review of legislation and policies with regards to smuggling in correctional 
centres of South Africa. The researcher studied confiscated unauthorised items that 
were reported to the Gauteng Regional offices by the three selected correctional 
centres, each unauthorised item was analysed to arrive at a reliable conclusion of 
the empirical research. The confiscation registers were kept at the correctional 
centre. The researcher obtained permission to access data from the selected 
correctional centres from the Department of Correctional Services National Head 
Office. 
 
1.10.2 DEMARCATION OF STUDY 
According to Auriocombe (2001:97), the study is limited to the unauthorised items 
that were smuggled into the selected correctional centres in Gauteng that were 
reported for the financial year, 2012/13, 2013/14.and 2014/15. Anonymity was 
observed, names of affected parties were not revealed only data was analysed. 
During the financial year 2014/15, Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre was 
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overpopulated with the occupancy level of 65%, Kgoši Mampuru II Local RD 
Correctional Centre was overpopulated with the occupancy level of 98% and 
Johannesburg Med B Correctional Centre was also overpopulated with the 
occupancy level of 247%. A large number of offenders in Gauteng are kept in these 
three correctional centres. It is also strange to find that the most of cases where 
smuggling occurred also affect these three correctional centres in the Gauteng 
Region. Although the results of this study cannot be generalised to all correctional 
centres, it provides a comprehensive description of the nature, extent and causes of 
smuggling at the typical correctional centres in South Africa. 
 
1.11 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION 
The researcher conducted a thorough literature review aimed at identifying and 
describing good international correctional practices in combating smuggling in 
correctional centres. The data gathered in this regard forms the basis of 
recommendations (see last chapter) in promoting good correctional practices in 
combating smuggling in correctional centres (see second objective of the study). 
Deficiencies and limitations in the policies regarding smuggling in correctional 
centres were identified and recommendations were made to the National Office of 
the Department of Correctional Services in order to make the necessary 
amendments.  
Data is collected and analysed from confiscation registers where smuggling played a 
role. Data was kept in a lockable steel cabinet in the researcher’s office which was 
always locked, files were not lying in the researcher’s office for everyone to see, 
information which can link the case to a specific offender or official was not revealed 
in the study or to anyone. Data was generalised to aspects or categories such as 
type of unauthorised items involved, frequency of occurrence, security risk factors. 
The researcher conducted the analysis on his own and did not make use of research 
assistants. The researcher analysed data from the selected correctional centres in 
line with instruction outlined by Department of Correctional Services in the approval 
document by the gate keeper. Data of smuggling reported in the selected 
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correctional centres and focus on following: WHAT was smuggled? And HOW 
MANY was smuggled. 
The gathering and analysis of quantitative data is primarily aimed at the achievement 
of the two objectives of the study, i.e.: 
 
 To describe the nature, extent and causes of the phenomenon of smuggling 
at selected correctional centres in Gauteng. 
 To make recommendations that may contribute to the prevention of smuggling 
in correctional centres. 
 
1.12 REFERENCE METHOD 
For consistency the adapted Harvard method of referencing (UNISA 2014) is used 
throughout the dissertation. Some practical guidelines used in other scholarly guides 
were adopted and in all references in brackets the comma is not used. For instance, 
no comma between the name and the year of publication. Direct quotes from 
sources are put in inverted commas or the sources are acknowledged in the text. For 
instance the researcher would state that according to Cavadino and Dignan 
(2006:430) correctional centres are or would put the text in full and acknowledge the 
author in brackets e.g., “These are unsound assumptions and create systematic 
flaws in the operation of a bifurcation approach” (Hucklesby& Dickinson 2007:271). 
 
1.13 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Request for the permission to conduct this investigation was forwarded to 
Department of Correctional Services and approval to conduct the study was given by 
the Department of Correctional Services. Only unauthorised items that were 
confiscated where smuggling has been an element were analysed. Confidentiality 
and anonymity of offenders and officials involved in smuggling was maintained as 
explained above. Data was handled confidentially (only by the researcher) and 
stored in a safe place when not in use. Research results were made available to the 
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Department of Correctional Services. There is also the potential for results to be 
published. 
 
1.14 SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTERS 
The dissertation will be structured in the following five Chapters.  
 
CHAPTER ONE: 
Introduction, here the topic was introduced including a discussion of the problem 
statement, purpose and objectives of the study, research questions and methodology 
followed. 
 
CHAPTER TWO: 
Literature review of the phenomenon of smuggling in correctional centres. The 
chapter also deals with good national and international correctional practices aimed 
at eradicating smuggling in correctional centres. 
 
CHAPTER THREE:  
Discuss the policies and procedure regarding the prevention of smuggling in 
correctional Services in South Africa. 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
Focuses on the empirical research conducted. Data collection of unauthorised items 
that were smuggled into the correctional centre were analysed in terms of the nature, 
extent and causes of smuggling at the selected correctional centres in Gauteng. 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
Provides conclusions from the findings of the research. Recommendations for policy 
implementation and the eradication of smuggling in correctional centres are made. 
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1.15 CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED DURING THE STUDY. 
This phenomenon of smuggling is seen as a reason for all the problems of order and 
security in correctional centres. The problems that were associated with this study 
are: 
1.15.1 INCONSISTENCY IN CAPTURING THE DATA WITH REFERENCE TO 
CONFISCATION REGISTERS. 
Headings of the Confiscation Register is characterised by dissimilar headings from 
the correctional centres under study, for example: 
 
1stRegister from one of the correctional centre consists of:  
Date Description 
of Items  
Circumstance
s Found 
By 
Whom 
SAPS Remarks 
Checked 
      
 
2ndRegister from one of the correctional centre consists of:  
Date Item 
Found 
Place where 
Items were 
found 
Official 
who 
found 
Items 
SAPS 
No. 
Place 
where 
Item kept 
Surname 
of the 
Recipient  
Checke
r 
        
 
3rd Register from one of the correctional centre consists of:  
Date Description of 
Items  
Circumstances 
Found 
By 
Whom 
SAPS Recipient  Remarks 
Checked 
       
 
From the above analysis of Confiscation Registers from the three correctional 
centres under study it was revealed that: 
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 Information is sometimes not registered on the same day of the event. 
Therefore, the clear sequence of events is not reflected in a chronological 
order. 
 All the registers are registering the unauthorised items which made it easy for 
data comparison. 
 The other registers are looking for the circumstances found. Whereas the other 
correctional centre is looking for the place where items were found which 
makes it difficult to compare the three correctional centres as most of the 
columns were not filled. 
 All the registers are requesting the name of the person who found the 
unauthorised items however, this information was also incomplete which again 
made it difficult to analyse. 
 All the registers request information about the reporting of the case to SAPS - 
in most cases no case numbers are registered, which means that cases are not 
referred to SAPS for further investigation. And follow up of the outcome of the 
cases was difficult. 
 Only one correctional centre has information on where the item was kept after 
seizure whereas the other two correctional centres do not register that, which 
also makes it difficult to compare the data.  
 The information about the perpetrator is always missing and is not reflected on 
the confiscation register. 
 Dagga is sometimes registered as bank size packet and dagga blades which 
make it difficult to compare the weight in kilograms because the people who are 
packaging this also do not use a universal measuring tool. For the purpose of 
this study dagga blades and bank size packets were converted into an average 
weight i.e., 1 dagga blade = 2 grams and 1 dagga bank size packet = 34 
grams. 
 
1.15.2 ETHICAL LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The gate keeper has given permission to the researcher to conduct a study at the 
Department of Correctional Services, Kgoši Mampuru II Management Area which 
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consist of five correctional centres and Johannesburg Management Area which 
consist of three correctional centres. Because of time and budget constrains the 
researcher was able to analyse data from Kgoši Mampuru II local Correctional 
Centre, Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre and Johannesburg Medium B 
Correctional Centre. The researcher was not allowed to take pictures for security 
reasons hence no pictures were used in this study. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON SMUGGLING WITHIN CORRECTIONAL 
CENTRES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
It would be impossible to cover all the issues available in the literature with regard to 
smuggling of unauthorised items into the correctional centres, nevertheless the 
researcher hopes to provide a relatively broad theoretical framework on this 
phenomenon of smuggling. 
 
In this chapter smuggling is seen as an organised criminal act that undermines the 
objectives of Correctional systems of the world. Correctional centres are seen as a 
different environment with their own sub-cultures. A comparative study of an offender 
incarcerated in a correctional centre and the general member of the public not 
incarcerated is also analysed. Policy with regards to unauthorised items that an 
offender is not entitled to have in a correctional centre is also outlined.  
 
Money is playing a central role in all the troubles of smuggling that are observed in 
correctional centres. Dagga is also playing a secondary role, which is also relevant in 
this scourge of smuggling. The cellular phones are used as a link to the outside 
world and contribute to all the problems related to smuggling.  
 
The problem of smuggling has a number of contributory factors that will be analysed 
in profundity. Elements that are contributing to smuggling will be analysed such as 
offender population, management of the offenders’ transgression and remedial 
action will be discussed. 
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Although fire-arms and explosives are not smuggled as much as the other 
unauthorised items these items are more deadly in nature and they are regarded as 
life threatening devices like all the dangerous weapons. 
 
The most profound consequences associated with the problem of smuggling include 
the killings of offenders, officials and service providers during escapes and 
disturbances of order in correctional centres.  
 
2.2. DESCRIPTION (S) OF THE CONCEPT “SMUGGLING IN CORRECTIONAL 
CENTRES” 
Smuggling should be classified as an organised crime because numerous tasks and 
people are involved in this operation of smuggling unauthorised items into the 
corretional centres. Smuggling activities involve specialised tasks such as the 
transportation plan, recruitment plan, procument plan of unauthorised items to be 
smuggled, bribing of security officials, and payment of collectors. For dagga to be 
smuggled into a correctional centre, dagga must be sourced from a reliable supplier 
who from time to time supplies a large quantity, another person transports the 
merchandise from the supplier to the next person who would package the dagga in 
such a way for it to be concealed. The next person usually an offender would recruit 
a correctional official who would at most be making sure that the dagga to go 
through the security check points without any hinderence, the offender would also 
employ other offenders as ’runners’: who would be resposible for the selling of dagga 
inside the correctional centre. Smuggling is a chain of command regardless of where 
it is conducted (Morselli 2014:118). 
 
Koshy (2008:70) maintains that “Correctional officials play a major role in smuggling 
drugs, weapons, alcohol and food into the correctional centre. A correctional official 
might want to conduct illegal activities without the possibility of disciplinary actions 
from the correctional centre. Therefore, a reciprocal relationship is built in which 
guards are granted financial percentages of the smuggling of drugs, gambling or 
alcohol, in exchange for turning a blind eye to the underground activity.” 
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Correctional centres are like an ocean that is relatively silent on the outside but when 
one goes deeper into an ocean one would realise that there is life and inexplicable 
activities happening inside the ocean. For the mere fact that people are born free, 
because of their failure to abide by the approved regulated ways of doing things, 
they find themselves behind bars, confined to a controlled environment where the 
authorities would attempt to rehabilitate them into law abiding citizens. It is rather 
disheartening to realise that despite all risks involved most of the offenders, some 
correctional officials, and the public continue to smuggle unauthorised items into the 
correctional centre. This phenomenon is widely experienced in correctional services 
around the world and also including South African correctional centres (www.prison 
writers). 
 
The problem of smuggling in correctional centres had its origins in the United State 
of America. The history largely ascribes this to offenders’ need to break away from a 
correctional system which was associated with inhumane treatment and punitive by 
nature. Institutionalisation was a more favoured way of handling offenders on a daily 
basis. Amid this primary objective of correctional centres smuggling was seen as 
insalubrious on the business of rehabilitation (www.thefix.). 
 
For an offender to have unauthorised items smuggled into correctional centres he or 
she must first smuggle into the correctional centre money that would be used to pay 
for the merchandise that is smuggled, pay corrupt official to turn a blind eye and to 
pay his people that are organising and bringing the item to be smuggled.  
 
2.3. NATURE OF UNAUTHORISED ITEMS THAT ARE SMUGGLED INTO THE 
CORRECTIONAL CENTRES. 
Correctional centres are seen as a different environment compared to a normal 
environment that an ordinary law abiding citizen is enjoying. A comparison of the two 
environments is essential in order to understand the root course of smuggling. Table 
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2.1 below shows a comparison of offenders and a person not in a correctional 
centre. One would take note of the following:  
 
Most people in the South African community have a cellular phone  
 
Table 2.1: Comparison between a person incarcerated in a correctional 
centre and an ordinary person in a community. 
A PERSON INCARCERATED IN A 
CORRECTIONAL CENTRE 
ORDINARY PERSON IN A 
COMMUNITY 
Limitation of movement Freedom of movement 
Limitation on choice of food - cannot 
buy food from a supplier of choice 
Freedom to choose food and buy from 
any supplier 
Limitation on communication Communicate freely 
No choice of furniture Free to choose furniture 
Deprivation of liberty Freedom  
Deprivation of cellular phones  Free to have cellular phones  
Deprivation of iPods  Free to have iPods 
Deprivation of smart phones Free to have smart phones 
Deprivation of money Free to have money. 
Not to drink liquor Free to drink liquor 
Cannot enter into a contract  Can enter into a contract of choice. 
Cannot run a business Entitled to run a business. 
 
Some of the unauthorised items smuggled into the correctional centres are seen by 
the South African public as items that are not prohibited however those unauthorised 
items are posing a security risk to the correctional centres, and the South African 
community. In this study the researcher only concentrated on the most common 
unauthorised items that were found in the selected correctional centres which 
disintegrate the security of the correctional centres. 
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From the researcher’s experience in Corrections the most common unauthorised 
items that are smuggled into the correctional centres range from weapons including 
fire-arms, ammunition, other dangerous weapons and explosives, drugs involves so 
called nyaope, mandrax and dagga. Electronic gadgets include cellular phones, 
chargers and SIM cards. Finally money being the main source of all ills in 
correctional centres. The above mentioned unauthorised items are further discussed 
below. 
2.3.1 INFORMATION DOCUMENTS 
Documents are usually used to distribute information about the security of the 
correctional centre and also used to arrange smuggling of unauthorised items 
into/out of the correctional centre. A piece of paper that is smuggled in or out of the 
correctional centre can transmit information that may result in life of people being 
compromised. From the researcher’s experience messages are usually written in a 
way that may misinform an unintended recipient or ordinary person, e.g. I love you 
can be written as w “+? 2) +- 16 1 4. 
 
2.3.2 DIFFERENT TYPES OF DRUGS 
There is variety of drugs that are smuggled into the correctional centres; they differ in 
shapes and sizes. Drugs commonly found in correctional centres are: dagga, 
mandrax and nyaope. These drugs are smuggled by corrupt correctional officials, 
private people who visit the correctional centres and offenders who for some reason 
pass through the main gates of the centre. Drugs are concealed around their body, 
some inside their food containers, some upped into their body cavity. Perpetrators 
apply different methods of concealing drugs which in turn calls for vigilant approach 
on officials responsible for searching at the main gates.  
 
Mandrax is a synthetic drug containing Methaqualone. The composition of the 
original Mandrax pill is a thin white pill, it is plus minus 1mm in size and is marked 
with MX as a trademark. The reverse side of the Mandrax reflects RL and it is also 
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available in capsules with two different colours from both sides. Because the 
Mandrax trademark is generally known by the public, the composition of this drug 
has dramatically changed in recent years. The thickness of the pill nowadays is 1cm 
and people call it double Barrel, and its colour ranges from pink, blue, purple, beige, 
black, brown and green and the mixture of two or more of the above colours. 
However, in South African correctional centres and the general public Mandrax is 
commonly known and named lizards, doodies, MX, Buttons, white pipe, press outs, 
flowers. Mandrax drugs are also used to mix with other drugs like Dagga and 
Nyaope (www.drugaware). 
 
2.3.3 DAGGA AS COMMON DRUG 
Dagga is one of the prohibited drugs in South Africa. The cultivation and the use of 
dagga was prohibited in South Africa since 1928 (www.flrc).It is a cheaper drug and 
easy to plant as it is derived from the plant. Sometimes it can grow anywhere and 
grow as high as 3 meters and 15 centimetres in diameter. The fact that it is easier to 
find dagga makes it possibly the highest drug in circulation in South African 
correctional centres. Dagga is mostly packaged in various sizes including grams, 
bank size bags, blades, fingers, matchboxes, sticks, balls, and compressed dagga. 
Dagga does not normally burn in its own, it need to be mixed with tobacco for it to 
burn and to be effective. However in South Africa dagga has different names 
according to geographical areas. Those names are, amongst others, Pot, Ganja, 
Dope, Hash, Zol, Marijuana, Green gold, Grass, Weed, Joint Skyf and Hemp 
(www.flrc). 
 
2.3.4 MONEY AS THE CENTRE OF ALL ILLS 
Offenders are not allowed to have money in their possession. Due to the fact that 
offenders use money in order to smuggle unauthorised items. Money is used by 
offenders to buy favours from corrupt correctional officials and also to gain control in 
a correctional centre. Money is at the centre of the ills happening in a correctional 
centre. Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 in Section 23 (1) (m) restricts 
offenders to possess unauthorised items  
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2.3.5 CELLULAR PHONES FOR UNAUTHORISED COMMUNICATION 
Although cellular phones are prohibited in correctional centres, a high number of 
these gadgets are removed daily during searching.The fact of the matter is that 
these gadgets are used in the planning and the execution of crime in and outside the 
correctional centre by the offenders. Cellular phones are sometimes used to plot the 
assassination of key witnesses and those whom they feel betrayed them. These 
gadgets are also used by offenders to defraud unsuspecting law abiding citizens by 
fraudsters who are serving sentences in the correctional centres 
(www.browardpalmbeach). 
 
2.3.6 ASSORTMENTOF WEAPONS 
There are assortments of weapons that are smuggled into the correctional centre 
with one clear aim of facilitating escapes and bamboozling the good order and 
security of the correctional centre, commonly smuggled weapons in the correctional 
centres are: fire-arms, bullets, explosives and knives.  Weapons are the most 
deadliest instrument used by offenders in an escape. And in the process lives of both 
officials and offenders are at risk and at times even lost. But a fact to consider is that 
fire-arms are smuggled into the correctional centre by people and those people 
passing through the main gates of a correctional centre with unauthorised items but 
are not detected and seized at the point of entry. Usually they would take in weapons 
in pieces. (Researcher’s experience) However offenders are not allowed to handle or 
possess weapons in a correctional centre. 
 
2.3.6.1 Fire-arms and bullets 
Fire-arms and bullets are the deadliest weapons and are not permitted inside 
correctional centre or next to offenders. If firearm and bullets are smuggled into the 
correctional centre, the lives of everyone within that particular correctional centre are 
at risk. Offenders, correctional officials and general public are at high risk of losing 
their lives at any time if the firearm and bullets are in the hand of an offender. 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT 
SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG. 
 
22 
 
 
2.3.6.2 Knives as a common weapon. 
The toilet flashing masters are broken by offenders and smuggled into the cells 
where they are modified to make weapons. Hence many toilets are registered daily 
as dysfunctional. Glasses are installed on the windows of all cells where offenders 
are accommodated and this practice is in line with Occupational Health and Safety 
Act 85 of 1993 which requires that any building should have enough ventilation. The 
normal window panes are broken by offenders and are wrapped around with pieces 
of cloth to make a weapon. Those weapons are used during gang fights by offenders 
to stab fellow offenders and also officials, however the correctional officials on daily 
basis conduct routine searching of cells offices but this type of weapon can be 
quickly be manufactured by offenders for instantaneous use. 
 Toilets flushing rods were used to manufacture weapons. 
 Pair of scissor dismantled to form weapons. 
 Pieces of metal used to manufacture weapons. 
 Bed frame used to manufacture weapons.  
 Window pane used to manufacture weapons. 
 Spoons used to manufacture weapons. 
 
Mostly these types of weapons are used by gangs to demonstrate their strength. 
 
2.3.7 WEAPONS 
There are varieties of weapons that are smuggled into the correctional centre with 
one clear aim of aiding escapes and bamboozling the good order and security of the 
correctional centre. Generally smuggled weapons in the correctional centre include 
fire-arms, bullets, explosives and knives (Researcher’s experience). Weapons are 
the most deadliest instrument used by offenders in an escape which can lead to the 
killing of officials and offenders.  
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Offenders are not allowed to handle or possess weapons but from experience 
weapons such as sharp instruments are in many instances found in offender’s 
possessions during searching. 
 
2.3.7.1 Fire-arms and bullets 
Fire-arms cannot be operated without a bullet, in most cases fire-arms are concealed 
in a dismantled shape; the parts of a fire-arm are mostly hidden in different locations 
and only assembled when ready for use. Because a bullet cannot be dismantled it 
will also be hidden as part of the package. Bullets and fire-arms are mostly used for 
the escaping. Offenders use this type of weapons to gain their way out of the 
correctional centre. 
 
2.3.7.2 Other dangerous weapons 
Self-made knives: Offenders use any pieces of steel or hardened plastic to 
manufacture self-made knives. 
 
Toilets flushing rods are used to manufacture weapons.  Toilet flashing masters are 
broken by offenders and modified to make weapons. Incidents of offenders who are 
vandalising the ablution facilities and breakages are common and registered daily to 
the Facilities managers. 
 
Glasses are installed on the windows of all cells where offenders are accommodated 
as required by the Occupational Health and Safety Act, Act 85 of 1993 to ensure that 
any building should have enough ventilation. This requirement is also supported by 
Correctional Services Act (Act 111 of 1998) which shares the very same sentiment 
that offenders must be held in cells which meet the requirements prescribed by 
regulation in respect of ventilation, sanitary installations and general health 
conditions. These requirements must be enough for detention under conditions of 
human dignity. The normal window panes are broken by offenders and are wrapped 
around with pieces of cloth to make a weapon. Those weapons are manufactured in 
order to protect smuggled items. These weapons are used during gang fights by 
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offenders to stab fellow offenders and also officials. Despite searching of cells and 
offices on a daily routine where these dangerous items are confiscated, they can be 
replaced easily because offenders can manufacture them quickly for instantaneous 
use. 
 
Other types of knives which are manufactured by offenders include: 
o Pair of scissor dismantled and rapped with a piece of cloth that will form a 
grip. 
o Pieces of sink metal are used to manufacture weapons. 
o Steel bed frame are used to manufacture weapons.  
o Spoons are sharpened to form weapons. 
o Knives may be stolen from Kitchen. 
o Sunlight soap bricks in a sock (so called aeroplane) - blocks of hard Sunlight 
soap are placed inside a socks, this is usually rotated around an open air 
before it is directed on a target. 
o Padlock tied on a rope: This type of weapons is used by gangs and non-gang 
members to demonstrate their strength. 
 
2.3.7.3 Explosives 
Explosives such as dynamite may be used to demolish the structure of a correctional 
centre in order to pull off an escape. It must also be mentioned that this phenomenon 
occurs minimally in the South African Correctional Services. 
 
2.3.8 DRUGS 
Drugs are unauthorised and are prohibited by the South African Law. Drugs are 
smuggled into the correctional centres through the main gates of the correctional 
centres by corrupt correctional officials, private people who visit the correctional 
centres and offenders who for some reason pass through the main gates of the 
correctional centre while there are security officials manning the gates 24/7. 
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There is a link between drugs and crime. Drugs are linked to crimes such as 
smuggling, stealing, sexual offenses, physical assault, robbery, murder, gang 
activities and escapes inside a correctional centre. 
 
Penfold, Turnbull and Webster (2005:06) illustrate that drugs that were reported to 
be in circulation were supplied through six different routes namely social visits, mail, 
newly arrived offenders, staff, over the perimeter and after court appearances.  
 
2.3.8.1 Nyaope 
Nyaope (Whoonga) is a fine white powder that is usually combined with dagga and 
smoked. The ingredients of Nyaope are heroin, detergent powder, rat poison, and 
crushed anti-retroviral drugs (www.mobieg).  
 
2.3.8.2 Mandrax 
Mandrax varies radically in appearance is commonly smoked. The MX tablet is 
crushed, mixed with dagga and smoked through a pipe or broken bottleneck known 
as a 'white pipe'. Mandrax can also be swallowed or injected. 
 
2.3.8.3 Dagga 
Dagga is a green plant-like substance derived from the Dagga plant. The Dagga 
plant can be found in the form of a bush, Dagga plantations can grow up to 3m high 
and 15cm in diameter. A distinctive of the Dagga plant is the leaf that can be found in 
the form of a hand and that usually consists of an uneven number of leaves, usually 
five, seven, nine or eleven leaves, situated on the stem. Drugs ;dagga is packed in 
various forms as an "Arm", Bank size bags, Blades, Finger, Matchboxes, Sticks or 
Compressed dagga. It is commonly called: Marijuana, Zol, Skyf, Joint, Weed, Grass, 
Shit, Pot, Boom, Ganja, Dope, Hash, Smoke, Hemp or Green Gold. Dagga is 
primarily smoked and is usually mixed in with tobacco because Dagga doesn't burn 
easily on its own. Pips and stems are removed (www.flrc). 
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A very popular method of smoking Dagga is in the so-called "Bottle Neck" or Pipe 
that is broken off or is cut from the bottle. In 1928 the cultivating and use of Dagga 
was prohibited (banned) in South Africa. Large numbers of drug users are 
incarcerated in correctional centres in most countries throughout the world. Rates of 
drug use by offenders is high, this view is supported by, Penfold et al., (2005:8). 
 
According to Strang, Gossop, Heuston, Green, Whiteley and Maden (2006:1) the 
incarceration of drug users leads to problems of order in a correctional centre. Drug 
users tend to have fewer educational qualifications, poorer physical health, as well 
as more behavioural, psychological and psychiatric problems.  
 
2.3.8.4 Methodology of drugs smuggling 
Drugs are concealed by smugglers around their bodies, some inside food containers, 
underwear or upped in the bodies’ cavity, rectum or back of the throat. Smugglers 
may spray the package with perfume to make detection by the sniffer dogs difficult. 
Drugs are also concealed in babies’ clothes or nappies (Penfold et al. 2005:15). 
 
Offenders are giving money to corrupt officials, fellow offenders or the public 
members in order for them to smuggle drugs into the correctional centre. 
 
Drugs are central to all the smuggling. Offenders use cellular phones in order to 
order drugs from the drug suppliers who are in the community. Drugs are also used 
by gangs. Drugs are contributing to the lawlessness in correctional centres of the 
world. 
 
The presence of drugs and drug use has fundamentally changed the correctional 
centres reality over the past two decades and, nowadays, all countries in Europe and 
South Africa experience major security problems due to drugs that are smuggled into 
the correctional centre to offenders. 
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Strang et al. (2006:2) suggested that drugs seem to be more prevalent in United 
Kingdom’s’ correctional centres. Smuggling of drug into the correctional centres is 
high. Offenders continue to smuggle drugs because of the level of disregard to the 
applicable laws. According to several studies in Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Austria, Portugal and Sweden between 3% and 26% of drug users in 
correctional centres report their first use of drugs while in correctional centres, while 
between 0.4% and 21% of drug users in correctional centres started injecting in 
correctional centres. Experts believe that the reasons for drug use in correctional 
centres are guided by ease prevalence of drugs in correctional centres. At several 
correctional centres in European Union it was discovered that the use of dagga and 
heroin were cited as the main drugs being used. Corrupt correctional officials in most 
cases are the ones that bring drugs into the correctional centres due to the fact that 
there are no stringent securities checks for correctional officials compared to the 
ones visitor are exposed to. 
 
In Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria and the United 
Kingdom has showed that a high proportion of offenders in correctional centres 
share injection equipment. Within correctional centres, drug use is often associated 
with the sharing of injecting material, and in some cases up to 100% of drug users 
reported sharing behaviours, syringes are cleaned with water only and, in 22% of 
cases, they are not cleaned. Sharing injection equipment in correctional centres is 
more frequent than in the community (Strang et al.2006:116). 
 
2.3.9 ELECTRONIC GADGETS 
Cellular phones, cellular chargers and SIM cards 
Cellular phones are not able to operate and deliver messages without a SIM card. 
Offenders mostly will have one or three cellular phones in a communal cell that 
accommodates ±50 offenders with close to 30 SIM cards which will be concealed 
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separately in the communal cell. Offenders will from time to time share the use of the 
three cell phones.  
 
Cell phones are becoming one of the most dangerous forms of correctional centre’s 
unauthorised items, because they allow offenders to bypass regulations and conduct 
illicit activities from behind bars. The age old cat and mouse game of controlling 
whom offenders communicate with in the outside world has been bypassed by the 
cell phones. The cell phones are creating a problem of safety.  
 
In the 1990’s the cellular phones were larger and heavier, today they are small and 
lighter, they can be concealed with ease. In many parts of the world unauthorised 
cellular phones have been used by offenders to arrange the silencing of witnesses. 
Cellular phones are also in the centre of smuggling activities. These unauthorised 
items jeopardises the safety of the South African public. Cellular phones are 
prohibited in a correctional centre; however large numbers of these gadgets are 
removed daily during searching operations.The fact of the matter is that those 
instruments are used in the planning and the execution of crime in and outside the 
correctional centre by the offenders. They are used for smuggling of drugs, lethal 
weapons like fire-arms and explosives into the correctional centre that are used in 
most of the escapes (Van der Laan 2012:1). 
 
Cellular phones jamming is prohibited and causes more problems than it solves 
because it don’t just obstruct offender’s calls, it can also interfere with emergency 
mobile number and public safety communication. 
 
A gadget (so-called ‘offender call capture’) was introduced, tested as a new 
technology in a number of United States with great success. The offender call 
capture is one technology with enormous potential to save lives and protect the 
public, while preserving public safety communications. It allows and passes through 
all 9-1-1 and authorised calls, and rejects unauthorised calls, including those placed 
by or made to offenders. This technology stopped 216,000 unauthorised calls made 
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by and to offenders from ever reaching their destination in just one month at its first 
trial in the correctional centre in Parchman, Mississippi. Advantages of the offenders 
call capture is that offenders call capture systems are legal when properly authorised 
by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC). Offenders call capture does not 
jam signals but rather acts like a cellular base station that picks up calls made within 
the correctional centre and passes along only authorised calls. If a cellular phones 
number is on an approved list, the call would be instantaneously handed off to the 
cellular phone company and handled normally. If the call is not on this list, meaning it 
is illegally placed by or to an offender; the call would not be completed and can 
receive an intercept message stating that the call is not authorised (www.ntia).  
 
Wireless 9-1-1 calls and public safety communications are put at risk by the use of 
jamming devices. National public safety organisations including the National 
Emergency Number Association (NENA) and the Association of Public-Safety 
Communications Officials (APCO) have expressed concerns with the potential for 
cell jammers to block 9-1-1 calls and disrupt critical public safety radio 
communications. It has not been demonstrated at this point whether jamming 
systems can be sufficiently designed and installed to prevent such interference 
outside of the correctional centres walls. Jamming thus has the potential to 
negatively impact response efforts by first responders and other emergency 
responders during emergencies. In fact, the Enforcement Bureau has received 
reports from police and fire departments receiving interference from operation of 
unauthorised jamming devices. State communications officials have expressed 
concern about jammers bleeding interference outside the correctional centre and 
disrupting police and fire-fighter frequencies which are close to cellular phones 
frequencies. The potential proliferation of cell jamming equipment, particularly if 
sanctioned, leads to great concerns for criminal or terrorist use absent significant 
controls. Cell jammers can be used to disrupt communications by the general public 
as well as state and local government for nefarious purposes, endangering public 
safety and security. In addition to being unauthorised, jammers are not necessarily 
the low cost option, and may be more expensive than other technologies. They 
require extensive engineering design to accommodate the various distinct building 
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features in order to provide effective coverage, and continued maintenance and 
monitoring, as well as distributed antenna engineering, cabling and secure housing 
to prevent tampering (www.nena). 
 
2.3.10 MONEY 
Money is the mother of all the wrongs of smuggling in correctional centres. It is for 
this reason that offenders are not allowed to have money inside the correctional 
centres. Offenders that are having money in their possession have the propensity to 
bully the other offenders and also corrupt correctional officials for them to render 
favours that will weaken the security and order of the correctional centre. Offenders 
are not entitled to have money in their possession. Money is seen at the frequent 
distributor of all the nuisance of smuggling that correctional centres around the world 
are faced with. 
 Offenders pay money to corrupt officials, fellow offenders or the public 
members in order to smuggle money into the correctional centre. 
 Offenders give money to corrupt officials, fellow offenders or the public 
members in order to smuggle food from the public food chains. 
 Offenders give money to corrupt officials, fellow offenders or the public 
members in order to accomplish an escape from lawful custody. 
 Offenders give money to corrupt officials, fellow offenders or the public 
members in order for them to turn a blind eye on smuggling. 
 Offenders give money to corrupt officials, fellow offenders or the public 
members for the smuggling of cellular phones. 
 Money is the cause of the disruption of order to security and order of the 
correctional centre. 
Offenders are able to smuggle money through the contact visit - their visitors will 
come into the correctional centre with money and during the visit they will find a way 
of leaving the money with offenders (sometimes the money will be swallowed by 
offenders, sometimes the money is concealed in the ablution facilities for offenders 
to get them after the visit, sometimes an official is bribed to turn a blind eye, 
sometimes money is smuggled to offenders by corrupt service providers (lawyers, 
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delivery vehicles), correctional officials are allowed to enter a correctional centre with 
money and some of the corrupt officials find their way to deliver money to offenders. 
 
2.4 CONTEMPORARY TRENDS REGARDING THE PHENOMENON OF 
SMUGGLING 
According to Sykes (1958:63) offenders’ perspective to incarceration is that 
imprisonment comes with pains for the deprivation of liberty, goods and services, 
heterosexual relationship and autonomy. Hence the offenders have limited freedom 
with a primary objective of correcting him/her into a law abiding citizen however 
offenders believe smuggling is a way of survival in correctional centre. 
 
Sparks, Bottoms and Hay (1996:132) states that Correctional Officials on their first 
arrival at a correctional centre have different expectations of a certain level of 
violence and that offenders must be kept behind bars under strict security. According 
to the White Paper on Corrections (2005), Correctional Officials are expected to play 
a pivotal role of rehabilitating offenders from their criminal behaviour into law abiding 
citizens.  
 
According to Luyt (1999:38) the “Department of Correctional Services in aligning its 
activities to the new democratic South African way of doing things shifted from 
inhumane to humane treatment of offenders and from a centralised to a de-
centralised management approach that is found in Unit Management.” Currently the 
Department of Correctional Services is dominated by the problem of non-compliance 
to applicable laws within the walls of its correctional centres whereby unauthorised 
items are smuggled into the centres. The causes of such non-compliance range from 
gangsterism, overcrowding, and disobedience with policies by the officials, offenders 
and the public.  
 
The Jali Commission (2006:825) found that some of the officials of the department 
even pursue the assistance of the gangs for their own ends, and this renders 
correctional centres uncontrollable. The Department of Correctional Services should 
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endeavour to maximize output with the available resources, but the biggest 
challenge of the Department are the unauthorised items smuggled into the 
correctional centres which erode the moral fibre that the Department of Correctional 
Services is intending to inculcate in the minds of offenders. Smuggling emasculates 
all attempts of rehabilitating offenders into law abiding citizens. 
 
None-compliance with policies of the department can lead to insalubrious relations 
between officials, offenders and the public. The goals and objectives of the 
department are also compromised. 
 
2.5 GOOD PRACTICES/STRATEGIES IN THE PREVENTION OF SMUGGLING 
IN CORRECTIONAL CENTRES 
2.5.1 METHODS USED IN COMBATING SMUGGLING 
Because smuggling is executed by people who from time to time would employ 
strategies that would emasculate the available means of making the correctional 
centre safe from smuggled unauthorised items, multi-prong strategies are employed 
to address this malady of smuggling. These strategies among others include the 
following: 
 
2.5.1.1 Searching  
Hernán (1998:2) states that searches carried out for security reasons inside a 
correctional centre are justified. Offenders all over the world try to smuggle a variety 
of unauthorised items for a variety of purposes.  
 
The main reason to search offenders and all people entering or leaving the 
correctional centre is to prevent offenders from smuggling unauthorised items with 
which they could inflict injury or harm on correctional officials, other offenders or 
themselves, and the South African community., This belief is underpinned by the 
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National Development Plan outcome 3, which elicits that people of South Africa are 
and must feel free. 
 
Generally speaking, three categories of searches performed on offenders can be 
distinguished, by increasing degree of thoroughness: 
o Pat-down searches of the clothed body; 
o Searches involving the removal of clothing – “strip searches”  
o Electronic searching that includes scanners and surveillance cameras.  
 
According to Stichcomb (2005:71) unauthorised items can be eradicated by 
searching offenders, their private property, cells, courtyards, workplaces, searching 
of visitors, correctional officials and offices. Searching forms an integral part of 
correctional centre security. - Body-cavity searches (visual inspection and manual 
probing) should be implemented with all the respect it deserves, not one of these 
strategies should be applied in an inhumane manner, but a consideration of the 
applicable policy is significant. All three types of searches are supposed to be carried 
out in a manner that would preserve the dignity of the offender or person searched. 
Obviously, searching can be conducted any time, while offenders are in their cells, 
when moving in or out of their unit to other units, recreational area, visiting area, 
hospital, courts, dining hall, and offices. 
 
Correctional services employ different methods of security to keep offenders in 
correctional centres and also to prevent the smuggling of unauthorised items into the 
correctional centres. 
 
Multi-pronged strategies are implemented in a fight against smuggling in correctional 
centres. 
 
There are three distinctive reasons for searching in correctional centres is outlined in 
Correctional Services B Order Sub Order 2 Chapter 14. (CSBO2)  
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 To find and confiscate any unauthorised items that may be used as a weapon 
against correctional officials, other offenders or the public; 
 To seize any illicit substances harmful to health, such as drugs, which 
offenders may attempt to smuggle into the correctional centre. 
 To recover any object that could be used as evidence when one offender has 
been attacked by another.  
 
The main reason to search offenders is to prevent them from smuggling anything 
with which they could inflict injury or other harm upon correctional officials, other 
offender or themselves and disturb the security of the correctional centre 
 
Sometimes offenders exert excessive demands on their support system, including 
trying to control their movements and social contacts. Most women experience being 
controlled and/or manipulated by their partners who are serving sentences. The way 
this control is expressed includes: frequency of visits, trying to restrict partners 
associations and demanding their account for how they spend their time and also 
forcing them to smuggle items into the correctional centre. Toepell and Greaves 
(2001:64), found it common for partners of offenders to try to provide offenders with 
unauthorised items that are prohibited as the offenders would demand them as it 
helped to alleviate their partners ‘suffering.  
 
2.5.1.2 Constant monitoring 
Constant monitoring implies placing Correctional Officials on the strategic position 
whereby they monitor and control entry and exit of people including, Correctional 
Officials, offenders and other people into the correctional centre. A correctional 
official must at all times be vigilant and be able to see and put a stop to the threat of 
smuggled items. A correctional official should at most be able to receive information. 
 
 Department of Correctional Services has correctional officials that are in the core of 
its operations, Department of Correctional Services must have good working 
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relationship with the other Government Departments. Inter Departmental relationship 
is important for information sharing with regard to all the security threats that  
Department of Correctional Services is exposed to. Correctional Official must work 
closely with the community members because they have information about 
smuggling and smugglers. Department of Correctional Services cannot fight 
smuggling alone. In addition Department of Correctional Services should foster good 
working relationship with non-governmental organisations. Smuggling activities must 
be reflected on the Annual Approved Performance Plan (APP) of the Department of 
Correctional Services.  Department of Correctional Services must ensure that 
service delivery is aligned to the National Development Plan (NDP). The (APP) is an 
essential building block towards realisation of the NDP.  
 
It is of utmost importance that, whatever Department of Correctional Services does 
as a government department, it must align all its activities to the broader government 
outcomes and the NDP. The below elucidated role players are pivotal in dealing with 
the annoyance of smuggling, smugglers and unauthorised items that are finding their 
way into the correctional centres. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Role players in correctional system and the fight against 
smuggling. 
unauthorised items that are smuggled into the correctional centres comes from the 
community hence fighting this scourge will always need the involvement of 
 
Offenders  Correctional Officials  
Non-Governmental 
organisations 
Government 
Departments 
 
Role 
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT 
SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG. 
 
36 
 
nongovernmental organisations that will be coming from the community, 
Government Department in the law fraternity, involvement of correctional officials 
in solving this problem is pivotal and offenders should be encouraged to refrain 
from smuggling activities. 
 
2.5.2 RESULTS OF SMUGGLING 
2.5.2.1 Gang violence 
Gangs smuggle unauthorised items that will contribute to violence in a correctional 
centre. Gangs commit acts of rape, bullying, manifestation of disorder, assaults 
during gang initiation rituals, assaults for promotion in the gang, assaults on a gang 
member as punishment/discipline for breaking code of conduct of a gang and 
demotion, assaults on non-gang members for general misconduct or disrespect 
against gang members and for gang activities against other gangs’ formations. 
 
2.5.2.2 Assaults 
Offenders always assault each other for possession of unauthorised items that are 
smuggled into the correctional centre. Assaults range from offender on offender 
assaults, offender on officials and officials on offender. These types of assaults 
normally take place after unlock and most likely in passages, kitchens, dining halls 
and also during the night inside the locked cells. 
 
2.5.2.3 Death 
Offenders kill each other and officials for or with unauthorised items that are 
smuggled into the correctional centres. Various incidents are recorded of correctional 
officials who were killed by offenders with fire-arms and other weapons that are 
smuggled into the correctional centres. Some of these incidents are discussed 
below. 
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At Kgoši Mampuru II C Max Correctional Centre, the Head of Close Maximum 
Correctional Centre and the Acting Area Commissioner of Kgoši Mampuru II were 
shot and killed by offenders with a smuggled fire-arm inside the correctional centre. 
During a foiled escape attempt, a correctional official was implicated (www.news24). 
 
Johannesburg Correctional Centre 2012 October 38 offenders detonated an 
explosive at the back of the panel van that was transporting offenders to 
Johannesburg Correctional Centre,(3) three offenders lost their lives and the other 
offenders were apprehended (www.news24). 
 
2.5.2.4 Escapes 
Through unauthorised items smuggled to offenders, Department of Correctional 
Services has experienced a number of incidents as outlined below. The incidents are 
narrated in an unsystematic order.  
 
During1995 at Kgoši Mampuru II Local Correctional Centre, Nine offenders moved 
out of the isolation cells, all nine of them were carrying firearms and cellular phones, 
they forced their way out of the correctional centre one correctional official was 
implicated (www.news24). 
 
A mass escape by 41 offenders at the Harrismith Correctional Centre has led to the 
immediate dismissal of two correctional services officials who were linked to 
smuggling of unauthorised items that were used by the offenders in an escape. This 
was the biggest single escape from a correctional centre in many years. 
(www.news24 
 
Escape of nine awaiting trial offenders from Durban Westville Correctional Centre on 
21 February2005. It was found that there had been a failure to comply with policy 
and operational procedures. A cellular phone had been instrumental in the escape. 
The escape plans had become known in November of the previous year 2004, and 
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offenders had been moved from Durban to Kokstad. One of the escapees had 
escaped eight times before. There had been a lack of managerial leadership and 
technical security measures. Ten (10) officials were subjected to the Department of 
Correctional Services disciplinary hearing, though there was no indication of criminal 
liability. The escapees were re-arrested.  The causes of this escape included the 
following: the escapees had obtained cellular phones; the bus transporting visitors to 
the correctional centre had not been searched; offenders used a makeshift rope to 
lower themselves from the seventh floor; they ran across the roof of the fifth floor, 
scaled the fence, cut through an outer fence and broke a fence post and escaped. 
Collusion between officers and offenders was suspected. There had been poor 
management of service providers. Service providers had to be thoroughly searched. 
They could bring in tools, and check out leaving some behind. No electrified fence 
surrounded the centre (www.news24). 
 
Because of the shift system fewer officials were on duty at Zonderwater Correctional 
Centre on 06/11/2005 an incident of an attempted escape at Zonderwater 
Correctional Centre in Cullinan just outside of Tshwane, which resulted in one official 
fighting for his life and one offender dead. One of the notorious Cash in transit 
master mind and others planned and executed a plan to escape from lawful custody. 
A group of five callous long term serving offenders with no respect for human life 
took hostage five officials in an attempt to escape from Zonderwater Correctional 
Centre in the morning of Sunday, 6 November 2005.The South African Police 
Service (SAPS) were immediately called in with their experts to help handle the 
situation. Negotiators managed to control the situation without panic or irrational 
decision that could have led to a bloodbath from about 11:00 until after 18:00.The 
offenders were demanding loaded assault rifles (R5), a getaway kombi with its 
windows painted to conceal people inside and a safe passage out of the correctional 
centre. The SAPS and Correctional Officials managed to save many lives. 
Regrettably one official was seriously injured, four other officials survived unhurt. 
One offender serving 80 years for multiple serious crimes including murder, armed 
robbery and possession of fire-arms and bullets was killed.  The four surviving 
offenders were immediately transferred to Kgoši Mampuru II C Max Correctional 
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Centre. These offenders include one who is serving two life sentences for murder, 
attempted murder and robbery, another one serving a life sentence for murder and 
robbery, another one serving a life sentence for robbery and the last one who is 
serving 15 years for rape. It was believed that there was collusion by at least three 
officials of the Department whereby a fire-arm was smuggled into the centre 
(www.news24). 
 
A notorious serial killer, serial rapist and armed robber from Mozambique who 
achieved further notoriety in 2006 by being the only person to have ever escaped 
from the maximum high-security in Kgoši Mampuru II C-Max Correctional Centre. 
This offender was initially arrested on 51 counts of murder, attempted murder, rape, 
hijacking and armed robbery in November 2006.Whilst being detained in the A6 unit 
of C-Max which houses dangerous and hardened criminals, he managed to escape 
by sliding out of his cell window, measuring only 20 cm x 60 cm. He had escaped 
from police custody before, previously in April 2005.He was found guilty on 64 
charges including rape, attempted rape, attempted murder, robbery and theft, and 
was sentenced to 54 years imprisonment (www.news24). 
 
Losperfontein escape: The incident took place in the early hours of the morning at 
approximately 03:00 when two awaiting trial offenders allegedly broke out through 
the correctional centre where after an alarm was raised by correctional officials on 
duty. Members of the South African Police Service around the area were 
immediately summoned and through their prompt response and action, a manhunt 
went underway. The search was very difficult to conduct due to rain and also that 
Losperfontein Correctional Centre is situated within a bushveld area, however, the 
offenders were recaptured at approximately 07:00 (www.news24). 
 
An escape incident that occurred at Mthatha Correctional Centre on 20 March 2011, 
whereby seven (7) offenders managed to overpower correctional officials. In this 
instance, only the unit keys were taken from the correctional officials by the 
offenders to unlock cells of other offenders. The unit keys were left behind by the 
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offenders and were recovered by officials after the escape took place 
(www.news24). 
 
Offenders escaped from the Barkley West Correctional Centre. The offenders took 
the correctional officials hostage and stole a firearm from a safe. On their way out 
they shot dead a correctional official in the courtyard. Four other correctional officials 
were injured (www.news24). 
 
Dangerous offender walked out of court. An investigation was launched into how an 
alleged bank robber, was able to stroll away from the court unchecked during a 
hearing in the Pretoria Magistrate court.  The suspect had been held as an awaiting 
trial in a high security correctional centre after being arrested over in connection to at 
least 35 armed raids. This escape was the second time in 2012 that the Zimbabwean 
has managed to flee custody. He had been kept under tighter security following a 
previous escape in March 2012.He was on remand for a string of robberies but 
previously escaped from correctional centre in March and was at large for several 
weeks before being re-arrested. He was neither chained nor shackled in the court 
building because he was walking on crutches after suffering leg injuries.  But he later 
ditched the crutches and strolled calmly out of the building after he was apparently 
left unattended outside the courtroom. Correctional Officials said they had warned 
SAPS about the possibility he might try to escape. In March, he was one of seven 
offenders who broke free from Boksburg Correctional Centre (www.bbc.). 
 
Kgoši Mampuru II Local - Attempted escape by three remand detainees on counts of 
armed robbery with aggravating circumstances and possession of unlicensed fire-
arms. In their attempt to escape, they got injured and were rearrested by 
Correctional Services officials. Their attempt to escape was foiled after they were 
spotted by a newspaper vendor who saw them jumping from the roof of a double-
storey building and climbing the correctional centre fence (www.news 24.com). 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT 
SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG. 
 
41 
 
Queenstown - Four offenders arrested for crimes including rape and murder escaped 
from the Queenstown Correctional Centre at 21:00.They broke a toilet window and 
cut through steel bars with a saw to make their escape (www.news24). 
 
According to Gelderloos and Lincoln (2005:16) offenders can do anything possible to 
win back their freedom. Usually imprisonment comes with depravation and limitation 
of certain rights. Therefore, offenders will also want to imitate correctional centre 
living conditions and make incarceration easy and limit restrictions as much as 
possible in their respective correctional centres by smuggling unauthorised items. It 
is this belief system that enhances offenders to continue smuggling unauthorised 
items.  
 
2.6 FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
Smuggling in correctional centres are characterised by smuggling unauthorised 
articles into and out of centres such as, fire-arms, ammunition, explosives, 
dangerous weapons such as knives, drugs such as nyaope, mandrax and dagga, 
cellular phones, SIM cards and chargers and money. 
Smuggling has dreadful consequeses that are epitomized by loss of lives and 
disregard for the policies and the maintenance of order in correctional centres. From 
the items that are smuggled into the correctional centres escape from lawful custody 
are more prevalent. 
Through unauthorised items smuggled to offender Department of Correctional 
Services has experienced a high number of incidents of escapes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES REGARDING THE PREVENTION OF 
SMUGGLING AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED IN RSA 
CORRECTIONAL CENTRES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the challenges experienced with the 
practical application of these policies and procedures. Although we have the 
legislation against smuggling in correctional centres, we still observe it. It is either the 
existing policies are outdated or do not address adequately all the challenges of our 
modern times. 
 
3.2 CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT 111 OF 1998 AND SMUGGLING 
Smuggling is a clandestine transference of unauthorised items into an area 
where are prohibited, for this argument smuggling is supplying of unauthorised 
items to offenders. This practice constitutes a crime according to Correctional 
Services Act 111 of 1998, Section 119 subsection (1) “No person may without 
lawful authority  
(a)  supply, convey or cause to be supplied or conveyed to any offender, or hide 
or place for his or her use any document, intoxicating liquor, dagga, drug, 
opiate, money, or any other article;  
(b)  bring or introduce into any correctional centre, or place where offenders may 
be in custody, any document, intoxicating liquor, dagga, drug, opiate, money, 
or any other article to be sold or used in the correctional centre; or  
(c)  Bring out of any correctional centre, or convey from any offender any 
document or other article.  
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(2)  No correctional official or other person in the service of the Department or in 
the employ of a Contractor may without lawful authority allow or participate in 
the commission of any act prohibited in subsection (1).  
(3)  Any person who contravenes any provision of this section commits an offence 
and is liable on conviction to a fine or, in default of payment, to incarceration 
for a period not exceeding four years, or to such incarceration without the 
option of a fine or both.”  
The narratives of the act and its section above do not talk directly to the problems of 
smuggling and the nature that it presents of being an organised act of crime. This 
Act is not talking direct to a person who is intending to smuggle a cellular phone, 
weapon or drugs which are commonly smuggled into the correctional centre. 
 
The Department of Correctional Services is mandated by the legislator to keep 
offenders in custody until they are lawfully released. During custody rehabilitation 
strategies aimed at discouraging offenders from participating in criminal activities 
should be applied. By placing rehabilitation of offenders at the centre of all its 
activities the Department of Correctional Services demonstrates the belief that 
offenders as humans can also change from their offending behaviour to law 
abiding citizens. Section 2 of the Correctional Services Act stipulates that the 
purpose of Department of Correctional Services is to protect and maintain South 
Africa which is safer, just and peaceful. This is possible through the 
implementation of sentences imposed by South African courts. However, 
offenders should be kept in a safe custody whilst ensuring their human dignity, 
promoting social responsibility and human development. 
 
However, acts of smuggling which are endemic in the correctional centres 
undermine the very purpose of Department of Correctional Services as mentioned 
above and this has become a pandemic experienced in correctional centres 
around the world including South Africa. Through use of unauthorised items like 
fire arms, we have observed with displeasure how dangerous offenders managed to 
shoot their way out of the most secure correctional centres in the country, e.g. 
Super/Close Maximums. The unfortunate tragedy happened in Kgoši Mampuru II, 
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where during a pre-planned escape, offenders managed to shoot and kill two of 
Department of Correctional Services’ senior managers. Such fugitives, whilst on the 
run they will continue terrorising and tormenting unsuspecting communities. They will 
never hesitate to commit new crimes involving house breaking and theft; robbery; car 
hijacking; rape and even murder. Gangs seem to be a major concern in all smuggles 
manifesting in correctional centres and they need to be rooted out. We have seen 
assortment of unauthorised items often smuggled in by offenders’ or corrupt 
correctional officials and visiting members of the public. Correctional centres are 
perceived as security areas where no unauthorised items should be found. Surely 
these items cannot just drop into the correctional centres from the sky as rain but are 
carried or transported in by the people who come in to contact with the offenders. 
 
Unauthorised items smuggled into the centre ranges from cellular phones, drugs, 
knives, fire-arms, letters, and information and so on. Cellular phones are gadgets 
that are mostly smuggled into the centres. Cellular phones are used by offenders 
for the commission of additional crimes whiles they are incarcerated in the 
Correctional centres. Offenders communicate with their associates in arranging 
escapes from lawful custody. 
 
3.3 MANAGERIAL STYLE AND SMUGGLED UNAUTHORISED ITEMS 
According to King (2015:45), correctional centre management style has an impact in 
maintaining order in South African correctional centres. An individual centre 
management is a key in setting the standard for social relations of offenders and 
correctional officials. King further emphasises that this relation be at the forefront of 
the whole correctional system. The author further deduced that when management 
provide authoritarian style of leadership to offenders, it is likely that offenders resort 
to violence as a means to show resistance to management style of leadership. 
However, the solution to combat violence in the correctional centres is through good 
communication between offenders, correctional officials and management. Boredom, 
depravation, depression can also promote and accelerate the extent of smuggling 
within the correctional centres.  
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According to Abramova, Avdeeva and Kovriga (2008:94) the marketing and dealings 
of drugs in the correctional centres is nearly the same as in the general public. 
However, in correctional centres setting the issue of drugs is escalated by corrupt 
correctional officials, visitors and corrupt service providers. It is also not a good idea 
to rule out the possibility that some of these drugs hail from the local offenders 
hospitals within the correctional centres. Visitors who provide services such as 
religious, spiritual, cultural, educational, awareness and technical may also form part 
of the chain that escalated the marketing of drugs in correctional centres 
 
3.4 UNAUTHORISED ITEMS THAT ARE COMMONLY SMUGGLED 
Unauthorised items that are commonly smuggled are documents, intoxicating 
liquors, drugs, money, cellular phones and weapons. Smuggling undermines the 
values of the Department of Correctional Services which are exemplified as: 
Accountability, Development, Equity, Effectiveness, Integrity, Justice, Security and 
Ubuntu. All the smuggled unauthorised items find their way into / out of correctional 
centres through a central point which is the main gates. Whereas there are officials 
manning those gates 24/7. And it is known by all officials that searching is a pre-
requisite for any person entering the correctional centre. Those perpetrators have no 
respect for the applicable laws of the Department of Correctional Services. An 
overview of unauthorised items that are commonly smuggled is narrated below. The 
unauthorised items smuggled into the correctional centres are supplied through six 
different routes: family visits, mail, offender admission, correctional officials, over the 
perimeter, court / hospital movement, by service providers, maintenance teams, 
agricultural teams and delivery trucks (Penfold et al. 2005:15). 
 
3.5 METHODS USED IN SEARCHING PERSONS 
Searching is a prerequisite for people entering or leaving a correctional centre 
and a person refusing to be searched may be refused entry / exit. The following 
searching methods are used: manual search, search by visual inspection of the 
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person and technical means of searching. X-rays machines and any technical 
device may be used by qualified technicians when there is reasonable ground to 
do so. This is always done when offenders swallowed substances that are 
regarded as unauthorised and which may cause damage to the offenders: 
Correctional Services B Order 2, Chapter 14 paragraph 2.4(d). 
 
3.5.1 APPROACH TO SAFETY IN THE CORRECTIONAL CENTRES 
It is the responsibility of every offender to accept the authority of the correctional 
centres and to obey all lawful instructions imposed by the correctional officials. 
Department of Correctional Services should make sure that offender safety is a 
priority and these include safe and secure environment, development and care, 
health and hygiene, including exercising within the correctional centre. According 
to Section 4 of Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 as amended, the 
Department of Correctional Services has to act on the basis of the above 
utterances and is obligated by the legislator in realizing this fundamental 
principle. Imagine a correctional centre where offenders disobeys the authorities, 
anarchy may prevail and the Department of Correctional Services would not 
realize its purpose of rehabilitating offenders into law abiding citizens that would 
be returned back into the society after the completion of their sentences. 
Smuggling compromises safety of offender’s, correctional officials and the South 
Africa public. 
 
Within the correctional centre, an offender who uses drugs poses threats to 
correctional officials and other offenders. This is because drug abuse turns 
offenders into violent behaviour which leads to assaults and even killing of staff 
or fellow offenders. It would also accelerate the incidents of riots, hostages 
taking, drug overdose deaths and suicides. The above mentioned incidents are 
likely to make the correctional centres ungovernable and uncontrollable. As a 
result, this would undermine all efforts to create a safe and secure environment, 
as well as, the integrity of the correctional system. These gigantic challenges 
faced by the Department of Correctional Services today are caused by a variety 
of issues including disparity in staff salaries, corrupt officials, overcrowding and 
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members of the public who violate safety and security rules of correctional 
services.  
 
3.5.2 OVERCROWDING AND ACCOMMODATION REQUIREMENTS 
Overcrowding is defined as the high number of offenders that are accommodated 
in correctional centres which are designed to accommodate a lesser number. 
Overcrowding in South African correctional centres is a reality. And this problem 
is not caused by the Department of Correctional Services as many people may 
perceive. But overcrowding is a direct result of the scourge of crime rampanting 
the South African society. Crime is a societal responsibility, those people who 
commit crime are amongst others, our brothers, sisters, friends, colleagues, 
mothers, and fathers, the society is responsible to correct them and give guidance 
before they are counted as statistics in correctional centre. According to Goyer 
(2011:3) the most serious problem facing South African Department of Correctional 
Services is the overcrowding of offenders which also nourishes the problem of 
smuggling of unauthorised items. South Africa’s correctional centres were designed 
to accommodate 100668 offenders. Currently they struggle to house 172271 
offenders. Overcrowding exacerbates the problems that correctional centres have of 
gangs, violence, sexual assault, public health problems and escape attempts. As 
such it makes managing a correctional centre difficult, and reducing the chances of 
rehabilitation. To make matters worse, The South African correctional centres are 
also under-staffed, proper searching and one-to-one care of offenders in the 
correctional centres is compromised, due to the fact that offenders do not have 
enough floor space. In some correctional centres, a communal cells which are 
designed to accommodate 24 offenders, are accommodating 90 offenders, in single 
cell which are designed to accommodate 1 (one) offender 2(two) or 3 (three) 
offenders are accommodated. Nationally, Department of Correctional Services 
consist of 241 correctional centres have approved offender accommodation which 
varies on different financial years due to maintenance of the buildings which render 
some units not utilised. To ensure the safety of the offenders, the correctional 
officials, and the greater community, security is a priority in any correctional centre. 
Overcrowding leads to poor training inappropriate supervision of offenders which 
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leads offenders harming each other, attempting to escape, or a general loss of life- 
(Goyer 2011:8). 
There are 241 correctional centres in the 6 (six) Department of Correctional 
Services’ Regions: 
 Gauteng  
 KwaZulu – Natal 
 Western Cape  
 Eastern Cape  
 Free State and Northern Cape (FS/NC)  
 Limpopo, Mpumalanga and North West (LMN)  
 
Correctional centres are classified as Minimum, Medium, Maximum and Close 
Maximum correctional centres. These facilities are distributed in the 48 
Management Areas. The correctional centres are further categorised as 
correctional centres for juveniles, men and women. We also have centres for 
sentenced offenders and remand detainees as outlined in the Department of 
Correctional Services Strategic Plan 2011/2012–2015/2016. 
 
The figure below shows different actual total number of offenders per financial 
year compared to approved accommodation total and overpopulation figures.  
 
Figure 3.1: Offender population as compared per financial year 2006 – 2012 
(www.dcs.gov.za). 
2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012
AOA 114386 115266 114559 114822 114000 114000
DAOP 158330 160370 157304 163599 164500 160280
OP 43944 45104 42745 48777 50500 46280
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The rate of overcrowding in South African correctional centre is high. This 
phenomenon is reflected by the disparity of Department of Correctional Services 
approved offender accommodation (AOA) compared with daily average offender 
populations (DAOP).  The figure above illustrates accommodation figures from year 
2006 until 2012 as received from Department of Correctional Services website 
(www.dcs.gov.za). The totals of Overcrowding as shown above are indicating that for 
some years there had been a gradual increase which is reflected differently when 
one is analysing only the current three years, because of the increase in the total of 
offenders the rendering of service such as individual offender management, 
application of security and preventing and removing unauthorised items that comes 
into the correctional centres through smuggling is compromised. 
 
3.6 CONDUCT OF OFFENDERS 
Rehabilitation of offenders is pivotal in the operations of Department of 
Correctional Services however offenders has a responsibility to make sure that 
they allow the rehabilitation initiatives by Department of Correctional Services to 
work for them. Rehabilitation involves changing the inner beliefs of an individual 
offender to participate in such initiatives. 
 
Through the implementation of rehabilitation programmes, the Department of 
Correctional Services aims at maintaining discipline and order; safety and 
security in correctional centres. Section 23 of Correctional Services Act (111 of 
1998) outlines the transgression for which an offender may be disciplined. These 
disciplinary infringements by an offender include the following: 
a) Replies dishonestly to legitimate question. 
b) Disobeys a lawful command or order. 
c) Is abusive to any person. 
d) Fails or refuses to perform any labour or other duty. 
e) Is careless or negligent with regard to any labour or duty. 
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f) Uses insulting, obscene or threatening language. 
g) Conducts himself or herself indecently by word, act or gesture. 
h) Commits an assault. 
i) Communicates with any person at a time when or a place where it is 
prohibited. 
j) Makes unnecessary noise or causes a nuisance. 
k) Without permission leaves the cell or other assigned place. 
l) In any manner defaces or damages any part of the correctional centre. 
m) Possesses unauthorised items. 
n) Commits theft. 
o) Creates or participates in a disturbance or foments a mutiny or engages in 
any other activity that is likely to jeopardize the security or order of a 
correctional centre. 
p) Professes to be a member of a gang or takes part in gang activities. 
q) Makes a dishonest accusation against a correctional official or fellow offender. 
r) Conceals, destroys, alters, defaces or disposes of an identification card, 
document or any issued article. 
s) Commits an act with the intention of endangering his or her life, injuring 
his or her health or impairing his or her ability to work.  
t) Attempts to do anything referred to in this section. 
 
2)  An offender who assists, conspires with or incites another person to 
contravene a provision of subsection (1) commits a disciplinary 
infringement. 
3.7 SALARIES OF CORRECTIONAL OFFICIALS 
Correctional officials are in the centre of order in correctional centres and they need 
to work together in realising this objective. But the current Occupation Specific 
Dispensation (OSD for Correctional Official 2008) for Correctional Services Officials 
creates the acumen of them and us. Non- Centre - Based officials turn to distance 
themselves from security activities and this creates a serious security breach. This 
dividing concept is shown in the disparity of correctional officials, in this OSD the 
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non- Centre - Based officials are on daily basis working with offenders but are not 
salaried like the Centre - Based officials and this leads to non-centre base officials 
turning a blind eye on issues that contribute to smuggling. In 2012 Department of 
Correctional Services had 40388 of correctional officials in its employment from the 
approved post establishment of 46874 with the vacancy rate of 13.8% (Department 
of Correctional Services Strategic plan 2013/2014). From the above figure one can 
safely say Department of Correctional Services has 24560 officials employed as 
Centre base officials who are hypothetical to be the ones that deal directly with 
offenders through the structured daily programmes of offenders. 
 
This leads to a conclusion that only 46874 of a total of an approved 
establishment of 24560 officials which is also halved to 12280 officials by the 7 
days establishment. Daily 12280 officials are expected to deal with 172271 
offenders and the unauthorised articles that offenders are trying to smuggle into 
correctional centres. The Department of Correctional Services is trying so hard to 
fill the vacant posts but this endeavour is not reachable due to the death of 
officials, retirement, officials dismissed for smuggling, exodus of officials to other 
government departments or private sectors. 
 
As mentioned above the reason for officials’ exodus from the department is the 
same salary levels but different salary notches which are brought about by the 
OSD. 
 
Correctional officials are pivotal in the rehabilitation of offenders, their duties 
include amongst others couching offenders into being law abiding citizens, and 
this responsibility is achieved through the following activities. 
 Constant offender monitoring 
 Individualised offender management 
 Sporadic searching 
 Rendering rehabilitation programmes. 
 Escorting offenders. 
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 Maintaining the safety of the correctional centre. 
 Removing unauthorised items from the correctional centre. 
 
The large part of the correctional officials is non- Centre - Based officials whereas 
the small number of officials are Centre - Based. Non Centre - Based are 
rendering Administrative and Support services - these officials are found at the 
Head Office, Regional Offices, Management Areas and some inside the 
correctional centres. These officials were previously able to beef up security during 
the weekends and holidays. Security incidents are mostly experienced during 
weekends and holidays when the deployment of the staff compliment is generally 
low. Currently because of this OSD non Centre Based officials are not allowed to 
beef up security during the times when staff compliment is low.  
 
This practice that comes about with this OSD is compromising security and it 
encourages division in the Department of Correctional Services whereby the 
other correctional officials are not contributing to the core business of Department 
of Correctional Services i.e., securing offenders in custody until they are lawfully 
released. By eradicating or putting an end to smuggling of unauthorised items in 
the correctional centres. 
 
Although Department of Correctional Services is a different community in a bigger 
community of South Africa, correctional centres have to deal with almost all the 
activities that are seen in a community. A correctional centre for example can 
provide for various activities also found in the outside “free world” such as, 
schools, recreational facilities, hospitals, workshops (carpenters, boiler makers, 
electricians, painters, welders, bricklayers, cabinet makers, all the trades) and 
provides for the services of social workers, psychologists, nurses, doctors, 
nutritionist, and even teachers All these people are rendering services to offenders 
in a correctional centres and are qualified in their trades and need to also be 
capacitated in dealing with offenders and their smuggling tendencies. 
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Incorporating these ‘specialists into the core function of security will most certainly 
add to the achievement of Department of Correctional Services objectives. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
NATURE, EXTENTAND CHALLENGES OF SMUGGLING AT SELECTED 
CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The nature of smuggling in correctional centres can be directly linked to the dealings 
and exchange of unauthorised items such as weapons, drugs, cellular gadgets and 
money amongst offenders, offenders and their visiting families and between 
offenders and corrupt officials. As a result of poor and insufficient searching 
practices, these unauthorised items are primarily smuggled into the correctional 
centres during visits of families to offenders, offenders returning from work outside 
the correctional centre (such as workshops and work spans) and corrupt officials 
who exchange favours and items for money. It is very difficult to determine the 
nature and extent of smuggling in correctional centres. The main source is found in 
records which are kept in terms of unauthorised items which are confiscated during 
the searching of cells and inmates. However, these records reflect what was 
confiscated and recorded only. It is common knowledge that the frequency and 
efficiency of searching practices is hindered by factors such as shortage of staff.  
Other factors which promote smuggling in correctional centres include overcrowding, 
an unfavourable staff-offender ratio and a high idleness rate. At most these records 
of confiscated unauthorised items provide an indication of the nature and minimum 
extent of unauthorised items in circulation in correctional centres. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to have a clear indication of the nature, extent and 
challenges of the phenomena of smuggling in selected correctional centres in 
Gauteng. Data was sourced from the regional security section. As such, the 
researcher analysed records of confiscated unauthorised items within the Gauteng 
Region in general and an in-depth analysis of records at selected correctional 
centres in the Gauteng Region in particular. The correctional centres which were 
selected for the empirical study of this research include the following: 
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 Johannesburg - Medium B Correctional Centre 
 Kgoši Mampuru II  Central Correctional Centre 
 Kgoši Mampuru II  Local Remand Detention Correctional Centre 
 
The correctional centres were selected because they are the three largest 
correctional centres in Gauteng. 
 
Lastly, the operational challenges and practices which impact on the frequency and 
efficiency of searches were scrutinised to establish areas for improvement. 
 
4.2 PROFILING OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF UNAUTHORISED ITEMS 
Unauthorised Items that are smuggled into the correctional centres are sometimes 
not presented in their original form but are concealed or given a different shape e.g. 
unauthorised items concealed inside a loaf of bread, to look like ordinary authorised 
items to an unsuspecting official who conducts searching. The nature and extent of 
confiscated items is elucidated below. At first a glimpse of the nature and extent of 
unauthorised items confiscated are given for the Gauteng Region as a whole, where 
after an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon is discussed for the three largest 
correctional centres in the Gauteng Region i.e. Johannesburg Medium B, Kgoši 
Mampuru II Central and Kgoši Mampuru II Local Correctional Centres. 
 
The nature of the empirical research conducted includes visits to the correctional 
centres and an in-depth analysis of records kept of unauthorised items confiscated 
from offenders for a 3-year period (Financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15). 
The purposes of the empirical research were to determine the nature and extent of 
unauthorised items confiscated from offenders. The data collected was also used to 
determine increasing/decreasing trends in type of items confiscated. A comparison 
of the nature and extent of confiscated unauthorised items between the correctional 
centres and the findings which emanated from the literature review was also done.  
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4.2.1 ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF CONFISCATED 
UNAUTHORISED ITEMSIN THE GAUTENG REGION 
Gauteng Region of the Department of Correctional Services has the following 
Management Areas under its control, Baviaanspoort; Boksburg; Johannesburg; 
Kgoši Mampuru II; Krugersdorp; Leeuwkop; Modderbee and Zonderwater. 
 
Data was collected from the Gauteng Region for the financial years 2012/13, 
2013/14 and 2014/15 in order to have clear indication of the nature and extent of the 
problem of smuggling in the Gauteng Region. The data was sourced from regional 
office security section which provided the Gauteng Regions’ confiscated 
unauthorised items.  
 
For the purpose of this study, unauthorised items are grouped into the following 
categories and items per category: 
 Weapons: Including items such as fire-arms, bullets, explosives, other 
dangerous weapons (e.g. all self-made knives, knives, broken glasses, pieces of 
steel, scissors, hag saws, iron saws, self-made stoves, plastic self-made knives, 
kettle elements, stoves, screw drivers, pots, sharp objects, tattoo machine, 
needles, steel spoons, syringes etc.) 
 Drugs: Such as Nyaope, Mandrax, Dagga (in various forms e.g., bank size bags 
= 34 grams/bag, blades = 2 grams/blade, and bricks etc., expressed in kilograms) 
 Cellular gadgets: Cellular phones, cellular chargers and SIM cards 
 Money: cash 
 
Table 4.1 below provides a summary of confiscated unauthorised items reported at 
the various correctional centres of Gauteng. Although not all categories indicated 
above are covered, data on certain categories is included. 
  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT 
SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG. 
 
57 
 
Table 4.1: Nature and extent of unauthorised items confiscated at correctional 
centres in the Gauteng Region for the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 
2014/15. (Gauteng Regional Office, Security Section). 
NATURE OF 
UNAUTHORISED 
ITEMS 
FINANCIAL YEAR TOTAL FOR 
3- YEAR 
PERIOD 
2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 
FIRE-ARMS 0 1 0 1 
AMMUNITION 29 8 0 37 
EXPLOSIVES 1 0 0 1 
DRUGS 
(incidents) 
574 456 78 1108 
DAGGA (kg)* 523.180kg 307.390kg 509.000kg 1339.570kg 
DANGEROUS 
WEAPONS(Items) 
2051 1650 3004 6705 
CELL 
PHONES&SIM 
CARDS 
8080 7466 15389 30935 
 
From the data in Table 4.1 above it is clear that in the Gauteng Region: 
 Only 1 (one) fire-arm was confiscated during the three year period i.e., during the 
2013/14 financial year; 
 37 (thirty seven) rounds of ammunition were confiscated during the three year 
period – the number of rounds confiscated indicates a downward trend (annual 
decrease) over the 3-year period; 
 1 one explosives was confiscated during the 3-year period; 
 A total of 1108 incidents occurred during the 3 year period where drugs were 
confiscated.  Despite a drop of -20,6%[((456 – 574) ÷ 574) x 100 = -20,6%] in the 
incidents experienced between 2012/13 and 2013/14 a huge year-on-year 
increase of 71,1%[((780 – 456) ÷ 456) x 100 = 71,1%] is observed between the 
2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial year; 
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 A total of 1339.57 kg of dagga was confiscated for the 3 year period - despite a 
drop of -41,2%((307.39 – 523.18) ÷ 307.39) x 100 = -41,2%] in the dagga 
confiscated between 2012/13 and 2013/14 the figures bounced back with a year-
on-year increase of 65,6%[((509 – 307.39) ÷ 307.39) x 100 = 65,6%] between the 
2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial year; 
 Dangerous weapons (i.e., all self-made knives, knives, broken glasses, pieces 
of  steel, scissors, hag saws, self-made stoves, plastic self-made knives, kettle 
elements, stoves, screw drivers, pots, sharp objects, self-made prison keys, 
tattoo machine, needles, steel spoons, syringes etc.) -not less than 
6705dangerous weapons were confiscated during the 3-year period.  Despite a 
drop of -19,6%[((1650 – 2051) ÷ 2051) x 100 = -19,6%] in the number of 
dangerous weapons confiscated between the 2012/13 and 2013/14 financial 
year, a huge year-on-year increase of 82,1%[((3004 – 1650) ÷ 1650) x 100 = 
82,1%] is observed between the 2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial year 
 A total of 30564cell phones/SIM cards were confiscated from offenders in the 
Gauteng Region. Despite a small drop of -7,6%[((7466 – 8080) ÷ 8080) x 100 = -
7,6%] in the number of cell phones/SIM cards confiscated between the 2012/13 
and 2013/14 financial year, a staggering increase of 106,1% [(15389 – 7466) ÷ 
7466) x 100 = 106,1%] between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years is 
observed. 
 
Overall a decrease were experienced in the extent of all the unauthorised categories 
during the 2013/14 financial year, while a significant increase was experienced in 
terms of dangerous weapons, cell phones and SIM cards during 2014/15 financial 
years. 
 
4.2.2 ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF CONFISCATED 
UNAUTHORISED ITEMS AT SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN 
THE GAUTENG REGION 
The following management areas in Gauteng Region have been selected for an in-
depth analysis of the phenomenon of smuggling: 
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 Johannesburg - Medium B Correctional Centre 
 Kgoši Mampuru II  Central Correctional Centre 
 Kgoši Mampuru II  Local Remand Detention Correctional Centre 
 
Data was collected for the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 in order to 
have clear indication of the nature and extent of the problem of smuggling at each of 
the three Correctional Centres in the Gauteng Region. The data was sourced from 
records of confiscated unauthorised items held at each of the Correctional Centres.  
 
The nature and extent of confiscated unauthorised items are analysed per 
Correctional Centre below. A comparative analysis between the three Correctional 
Centres is given in terms of a summary. 
 
4.2.2.1 Analysis of the nature and extent of confiscated unauthorised items 
at Johannesburg - Medium B Correctional Centre 
Only sentenced male offenders are incarcerated in this centre.  The approved 
accommodation at the Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre is 1300 with a 
staff establishment of 439. The daily average inmate population for 2014/15was 
3110.The occupation percentage for 2014/15 was [(3110 ÷ 1300) x100 = 239%].  
This implies a overcrowding of 139%. The staff-offender ratio for 2014/15 was 1 staff 
member per 7 offenders (3110 ÷ 439 = 7 approximated), which is more than double 
the required ratio of 1 staff member per 3 offenders (1300 ÷ 439 = 3 approximated). 
 
Table 4.2 below provides a summary of confiscated unauthorised items reported at 
the Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre, for the financial years 2012/13, 
2013/14 and 2014/15. 
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Table 4.2:  Summary of recorded confiscated unauthorized items at the 
Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre, for the financial years 2012/13, 
2013/14 and 2014/15. (Correctional Centre Johannesburg Medium B, Security 
Section). 
UNAUTHORISED ITEMS  TOTALS PER FINANCIAL YEAR TOTAL 
FOR 3 
YEAR 
PERIOD 
CATEGORY 
 
ITEM 
 
2012/13 
 
2013/14 
 
2014/15 
 
WEAPONS 
Fire-arms 0 0 0 0 
Bullets 0 0 0 0 
Other dangerous 
weapons 246 126 193 
565 
Explosives 0 0 0 0 
DRUGS 
Nyaope 3 3 0 6 
Mandrax 0 0 0 0 
Dagga - bank size 
(N1) 40 78 348 
466 
Dagga - blades 
(N2) 680 1096 676 
2452 
Dagga - 
kilograms (N3) 24.653 3.52 13.48 
 
41.653 
Total Dagga – 
kilograms* 27.373 8.364 26.664 
 
62.401 
ELECTRONIC 
GADGETS  
Cellular phones 504 1463 1349 3316 
Cellular chargers 244 332 256 832 
SIM cards 523 1355 1688 3566 
MONEY 
Bank Cards 0 0 0 0 
Cash R17,056 R16,907 R15,744 R34,497 
*Total Dagga (kg) = (N1 x 0.034) + (N2 x 0.002) + N3 
Explanation: one blade = 2 grams (approximately), one small bank bag = 34 grams 
(approximately) 
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From the data in Table 4.2 above it is clear that at the Johannesburg Medium B 
Correctional Centre: 
 No fire-arms, bullets or explosives was confiscated during the three year period; 
 Not less than 565 other dangerous weapons were confiscated during the 3-year 
period.  Despite a drop of -48,8%[((126 – 246) ÷ 246) x 100 = -48,8%] in the 
number of other dangerous weapons confiscated between the 2012/13 and 
2013/14 financial year, a huge year-on-year increase of 82,1%[((3004 – 1650) ÷ 
1650) x 100 = 82,1%] is observed between the 2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial 
year 
 A total of only 6 incidents occurred during the 3 year period where drugs 
(Nyaope) were confiscated. 
 A total of 2452 dagga blades, 466 bank size bags and another 41.653 kg of 
dagga, which add up to a total of 66.401 kg of dagga was confiscated for the 3 
year period. Despite a drop of -69.4%[((8.364 – 27.373) ÷ 27.373) x 100 =  
-69.4%] in the total dagga confiscated between 2012/13 and 2013/14 the figures 
bounced back with a staggering year-on-year increase of 218,8% [((26.664 –
8.364) ÷8.364) x 100 = 218.8%] between the 2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial 
year; 
 A total of 3316 cell phones, 832 cellular chargers and 3566SIM cards were 
confiscated from offenders at the Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre 
during the 3-year period.  Despite a decrease of -22,9% [((256 – 332) ÷ 332) x 
100 = -22,9%)] in the number of cellular chargers as well as a relatively low 
decrease of cellular phones of -7,8% [((1349 – 1463) ÷ 1463) x 100 = -7,8%)] 
confiscated between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial year, an increase 
of24,6% [(1688 – 1355) ÷ 1355) x 100 = 24,6%)] between the 2013/14 and 
2014/15 financial years is observed. 
 A total of R34, 497 was confiscated for the 3-year period.  A slight decrease in 
amounts of money confiscated was observed in year on year basis. 
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Overall a decrease was experienced in the extent of confiscated unauthorised items 
such as other dangerous weapons and the total kilograms of dagga, during the 
2013/14 financial year.  However, a significant year on year increase was 
experienced in terms of the number of SIM cards confiscated. 
 
4.2.2.2 Analysis of the nature and extent of confiscated unauthorised 
items at Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre 
Only sentenced male offenders are incarcerated in this centre.  The approved 
accommodation at the Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre is 2171 with a 
staff establishment of 720. The daily average inmate population for 2014/15 was 
2574.  The occupation percentage for 2014/15 was [(2574 ÷ 2171) x100 = 119%].  
This implies an overcrowding of 19%. The staff-offender ratio for 2014/15 was 1 staff 
member per 4 offenders (2574 ÷ 720 = 4 approximated), which is 1 offender more 
per staff member than the required ratio of 1 staff member per 3 offenders (2171 ÷ 
720 = 3 approximated). 
 
Table 4.3 below provides a summary of confiscated unauthorised items reported at 
the Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre, for the financial years 2012/13, 
2013/14 and 2014/15. 
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Table 4.3:  Summary of recorded confiscated unauthorized items at the Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre, for 
the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15. (Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre, Security Section). 
UNAUTHORISED ITEMS  
 
TOTALS PER FINANCIAL YEAR TOTAL FOR 3 
YEAR PERIOD 
CATEGORY ITEM 
2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 
WEAPONS 
Fire-arms 0 0 0 0 
Bullets 0 0 0 0 
Other dangerous weapons 317 600 571 1488 
Explosives 0 1 0 1 
DRUGS 
Nyaope 0 67 0 67 
Mandrax 36 0 0 36 
Dagga - bank size (N1) 228 279 605 1112 
Dagga - blades (N2) 721 491 2639 3851 
Dagga - kilograms (N3) 70.964 60.741 54.417 186.122 
Total Dagga – kilograms* 80.158 62.139 80.265 222.562 
ELECTRONIC GADGETS  
Cellular phones 701 393 1551 2645 
Cellular chargers 629 94 31 754 
SIM cards 758 557 1629 2944 
MONEY 
Bank Cards 246 2 0 248 
Cash R363 R310 R149 R822 
 
*Total Dagga (kg) = (N1 x 0.034) + (N2 x 0.002) + N3 
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Explanation: one blade = 2 grams (approximately), one small bank bag = 34 grams 
(approximately) 
From the data in Table 4.3 above it is clear that at Kgoši Mampuru II Central 
Correctional Centre: 
 No fire-arms was confiscated during the three year period; 
 However, one bullet and 0 explosive device were confiscated during the 2013/14 
financial year; 
 Not less than 1488 other dangerous weapons were confiscated during the 3-year 
period. An significant increase of 89,3%[((600 – 317) ÷ 317) x 100 = 89,3%] in the 
number of other dangerous weapons confiscated between the 2012/13 and 
2013/14 financial year was observed. A slight decrease of 4,8%[((571 – 600) ÷ 
600) x 100 = 4,8%] is observed between the 2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial 
year; 
 A total of 103 incidents (67 incidents of Nyaope during the 2013/14 financial year 
and 36 incidents of Mandrax during the 2012/13 financial year) occurred where 
drugs were confiscated; 
 A total of 3851 dagga blades, 1112 bank size bags and another 186.122 kg of 
dagga, which add up to a total of 222.562 kg of dagga was confiscated for the 3 
year period.  Despite a drop of -22,5%[((62.139 – 80.158) ÷ 80.158) x 100 =  
-22,5%] in the total dagga confiscated between 2012/13 and 2013/14 the figures 
bounced back with a year-on-year increase of 29,2%[((80.265 – 62.139) ÷ 
62.139) x 100 = 29,2%] between the 2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial year; 
 A total of 2645 cell phones, 754 cellular chargers and 2944SIM cards were 
confiscated from offenders at the Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre 
during the 3-year period.  A year-on-year decrease of -43,9% [((393 – 701) ÷ 
701) x 100 = -43,9%)] in the number of cellular phones confiscated, a year-on-
year decrease of -85,1% [((94 – 629) ÷ 629) x 100 = -85,1%)] in the number of 
cellular chargers confiscated and a year-on-year decrease of -26,1% [((557 – 
758) ÷ 758) x 100 = -26,1%)] in the number of SIM cards confiscated, were 
observed between the 2012/13 and 2013/14 financial years.  However, a year-
on-year increase of 294,7% [(1551 – 393) ÷ 393) x 100 = 294,7%)] in the number 
of cellular phones confiscated, and a year-on-year increase of 192,5% [(1629 – 
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557) ÷ 557) x 100 = 192,5%)] in the number of SIM cards confiscated, were 
observed between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years; 
 A total of 248 bank cards and R822 cash were confiscated for the 3-year period.  
A year-on-year decrease in the number of bank card and the amount of cash 
confiscated is observed. 
 
Overall a decrease was experienced in the extent of confiscated unauthorised items 
such as the total kilograms of dagga, electronic gadgets and money during the 
2013/14 financial year.  However, a significant year-on-year increase was observed 
in terms of the number of the total dagga, cell phones and SIM cards confiscated 
between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years. 
 
4.2.2.3 Analysis of the nature and extent of confiscated unauthorised 
items at Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention Correctional 
Centre 
Only remand male detainees are incarcerated in this centre.  The approved 
accommodation at the Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention Correctional 
Centre is 1563 with a staff establishment of 572. The daily average inmate 
population for 2014/15 was 2904.  The occupation percentage for 2014/15 was 
[(2904 ÷ 1563) x 100 = 186%].  This implies a overcrowding of 86%. The staff-
offender ratio for 2014/15 was 1 staff member per 5 offenders (2904 ÷ 572 = 5 
approximated), which is 2 offenders more per staff member than the required ratio of 
1 staff member per 3 offenders (1563 ÷ 572 = 3 approximated). 
 
Table 4.4 below provides a summary of confiscated unauthorised items reported at 
the Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention Correctional Centre, for the financial 
years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15. 
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Table 4.4:  Summary of recorded confiscated unauthorized items at the Correctional Centre Kgoši Mampuru II Local 
Remand Detention, for the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15. (Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention 
Correctional Centre, Security Section). 
UNAUTHORISED ITEMS  TOTALS PER FINANCIAL YEAR TOTAL FOR 3 
YEAR PERIOD 
CATEGORY ITEM 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 
WEAPONS 
Fire-arms 0 0 0 0 
Bullets 0 0 0 0 
Other dangerous weapons 431 212 532 1175 
Explosives 0 0 0 0 
DRUGS 
Nyaope 6 16 3 25 
Mandrax 0 0 0 0 
Dagga - bank size (N1) 186 460 246 892 
Dagga - blades (N2) 363 322 476 1161 
Dagga - kilograms (N3) 23.64 5.47 113.53 142.640 
Total Dagga – kilograms* 30.690 16.284 122.846 169.820 
ELECTRONIC GADGETS  
Cellular phones 147 132 280 559 
Cellular chargers 41 38 42 121 
SIM cards 274 170 309 753 
MONEY 
Bank Cards 0 0 0 0 
Cash R1,156 R8,386 R4,567 R14,109 
*Total Dagga (kg) = (N1 x 0.034) + (N2 x 0.002) + N3 
Explanation: one blade = 2 grams (approximately), one small bank bag = 34 grams (approximately)  
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From the data in Table 4.4 above it is clear that at the Kgoši Mampuru II Local 
Remand Detention Correctional Centre: 
 No fire-arms, ammunition or explosives were confiscated during the three year 
period; 
 Not less than 1175 other dangerous weapons were confiscated during the 3-year 
period.  Although a decrease of 50,8%[((212 – 431) ÷ 431) x 100 = 50,8%] in the 
number of other dangerous weapons confiscated was observed between the 
2012/13 and 2013/14 financial the figures bounced back with an significant 
increase of 150,9%[((532 – 212) ÷ 212) x 100 = 150,9%] between the 2013/14 
and the 2014/15 financial year; 
 A total of 25incidents occurred during the 3-year period where drugs(Nyaope) 
were confiscated; 
 A total of 1161 dagga blades, 892 bank size bags and another 142.640 kg of 
dagga, which add up to a total of 169.820 kg of dagga was confiscated for the 3 
year period.  Despite a drop of -46,9%[((16.284 – 30.690) ÷ 30.690) x 100 =  
-46,9%] in the total dagga confiscated between 2012/13 and 2013/14 the figures 
increased drastically with 654,4%[((122.846 – 16.284) ÷ 16.284) x 100 = 654,4%] 
between the 2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial year; 
 A total of 559cell phones, 121cellular chargers and 753SIM cards were 
confiscated from offenders at the Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention 
Correctional Centre during the 3-year period.  Despite a small decrease in the 
numbers of cell phones, chargers and SIM cards confiscated during the 2013/14 
financial year, significant year-on-year increases of 112,1% [(280 – 132) ÷ 132) x 
100 = 192,5%)] in the number of cellular phones confiscated, and a year-on-year 
increase of 81,8% [(309 – 170) ÷ 170) x 100 = 81,8%)] in the number of SIM 
cards confiscated, were observed between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial 
years; 
 A total R14, 109 cash were confiscated for the 3-year period with the highest 
amount of R8, 386 confiscated during the 2013/14 financial year. 
 
Overall a decrease was experienced in the extent of confiscated unauthorised items 
such as other dangerous weapons, the total kilograms of dagga, and electronic 
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gadgets during the 2013/14 financial year.  However, a significant year-on-year 
increase was observed in terms of the number of other dangerous weapons, the total 
dagga, cellular gadget such as cell phones, chargers and SIM cards confiscated 
between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years. 
 
4.2.2.4 Comparative analysis of the nature and extent of confiscated 
unauthorised items at the three selected Correctional Centres in 
Gauteng 
In table 4.5 below, a summary of the type and extent of unauthorised items 
confiscated at the three correctional centres are displayed: 
 
From the data in Table 4.5 it is evident that: 
 unauthorised items  were confiscated at the three Correctional Centres in respect 
of all of various categories i.e., weapons, drugs, electronic gadgets and money; 
 only 1 round of ammunition was confiscated at Kgoši Mampuru II Central during 
the 2013/14 financial year; 
 no explosives were confiscated during the 3-year period; 
 sporadic incidents occurred at all three the correctional centres where drugs 
(Nyaope) were confiscated, while Mandrax was only confiscated at Kgoši 
Mampuru II Central during the 2012/13 financial year; 
 dagga in various forms (bank size bags, blades, bricks and kilograms) were 
confiscated at all the three Correctional Centre throughout the 3-year period; 
 other dangerous weapons (i.e., all self-made knives, knives, broken glasses, 
pieces of  steel, scissors, hag saws, self-made stoves, plastic self-made knives, 
kettle elements, stoves, screw drivers, pots, sharp objects, self-made prison 
keys, tattoo machine, needles, steel spoons, syringes etc.) were confiscated at all 
the three Correctional Centres throughout the 3-year period; 
 cell phones, chargers and SIM card were confiscated from at all the three 
Correctional Centres throughout the 3-year period; 
 bank cards were only confiscated at Kgoši Mampuru II Central during the 201213 
and 2013/14 financial years; 
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 Cash were confiscated from at all the three Correctional Centres throughout the 
3-year period. 
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Table 4.5:  Summary of recorded confiscated items at the Correctional Centres Johannesburg Medium B, Kgoši 
Mampuru II Central and Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention, for the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 
(Security Offices of the 3 Correctional Centres) 
UNAUTHORISED ITEMS  
 
JOHANNESBURG MED B 
 
KGOŠI MAMPURU II CENTRAL  KGOŠI MAMPURU II LOCAL REMAND 
DETENTION  
CATEGORY 
 
ITEM 
 
Totals per financial year Totals per financial year Totals per financial year 
2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 
WEAPONS 
Fire-arms 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bullets 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Other dangerous weapons 246 126 193 317 600 571 431 212 532 
Explosives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DRUGS 
Nyaope 3 3 0 0 67 0 6 16 3 
Mandrax 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 0 0 
Dagga - bank size (N1) 40 78 348 228 279 605 186 460 246 
Dagga - blades (N2) 680 1096 676 721 491 2639 363 322 476 
Dagga - kilograms (N3) 24.653 3.52 13.48 70.964 60.741 54.417 23.64 5.47 113.53 
Total Dagga – kilograms* 27.373 8.364 26.664 80.158 62.139 80.265 30.690 16.284 122.846 
ELECTRONIC 
GADGETS  
Cellular phones 504 1463 1349 701 393 1551 147 132 280 
Cellular chargers 244 332 256 629 94 31 41 38 42 
SIM cards 523 1355 1688 758 557 1629 274 170 309 
MONEY 
Bank Cards 0 0 0 246 2 0 0 0 0 
Cash R17,056 R16,907 R15,744 R363 R310 R149 R1,156 R8,386 R4,567 
*Total Dagga (kg) = (N1 x 0.034) + (N2 x 0.002) + N3 
Explanation: one blade = 2grams (approximately), one small bank bag = 34 grams (approximately) 
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4.2.2.5 Trend analysis of the extent of selected confiscated unauthorised 
items at the three Correctional Centres in Gauteng 
In this section the focus is on a trend analysis of the extent of the following confiscated 
unauthorised items at the three Correctional Centres in Gauteng: 
 Other dangerous weapons confiscated 
 Total Dagga confiscated 
 Cellular gadgets such as cell phones and SIM card confiscated 
 Cash confiscated 
 
(i) Other dangerous weapons 
The extent of the number of confiscated ‘other dangerous weapons’ per Correctional 
Centre are displayed in Table 4.6 below. A forecast (based on the actual numbers for 
the financial year 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15) of the number of confiscated ‘other 
dangerous weapons’ foreseen for the 2015/16 is also portrayed in Table 4.6 below.  
The FORECAST function in Microsoft Excel is used to calculate the projected value. 
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Table 4.6: Actual number of ‘other dangerous weapons’ confiscated during 
the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 and a forecast of the number 
of ‘other dangerous weapons’ projected to be confiscated during the 2015/16 
financial year, per Correctional Centre. 
Financial Year Number of other dangerous weapons 
confiscated/projected per Correctional 
Centre 
Total 
number of 
other 
weapons 
confiscate
d / 
projected 
Johannesbu
rg Med B 
Kgoši 
Mampuru II 
Central 
Kgoši 
Mampuru II 
Local  
2012/13 246 317 431 994 
2013/14 126 600 212 938 
2014/15 193 571 532 1296 
Projected number 
for 2015/16 
135 750 493 1378 
 
The trends in the extent of confiscated ‘other dangerous weapons’ for the three 
Correctional Centres and in total are displayed in graph 4.1 below 
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Graph 4.1: Trends for the confiscated unauthorised article ‘other dangerous 
weapons’ for the Correctional Centres Johannesburg Medium B, Kgoši 
Mampuru II Central and Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention individually 
and in total for the 3 financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15, and projected 
for 2015/16 
The following trends are observed for each of the three Correctional Centres as 
displayed in Graph 4.1 above: 
 A downward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a marginal upward trend 
between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Johannesburg Medium B 
Correctional Centre, with a marginal downward trend projected for the 2015/16 
financial year. 
 An upward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a marginal downward 
trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Kgoši Mampuru II 
Central Correctional Centre, with an upward trend projected for the 2015/16 
financial year. 
 An upward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a marginal downward 
trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Kgoši Mampuru II 
Local Remand Detention Centre, with a marginal downward trend projected for 
the 2015/16 financial year. 
The number of ‘other dangerous weapons’ confiscated for the three Correctional 
Centres in total as displayed in Graph 4.1, indicates a marginal downward trend 
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between the 2012/13 and 2013/14 financial years with a steep upward trend between 
the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years and a gradual upward trend projected 
between the 2014/15 and 2015/16 financial year. 
 
(ii) Total Dagga confiscated 
The kilograms of dagga confiscated per Correctional Centre individually and in total 
are displayed in Table 4.7. A forecast (based on the actual numbers for the financial 
year 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15) of the kilograms of dagga foreseen to be 
confiscated for the 2015/16 is also portrayed in Table 4.7 below.  The FORECAST 
function in Microsoft Excel is used to calculate the projected weight. 
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Table 4.7: Actual weight (kg) of dagga confiscated during the financial years 
2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 and a forecast of the projected kilograms of dagga 
to be confiscated during the 2015/16 financial year, per Correctional Centre 
individually and in total. 
Financial 
Year 
Kilograms of dagga confiscated/projected per 
Correctional Centre 
Total 
kilograms of 
dagga 
confiscated / 
projected 
Johannesburg 
Med B 
Kgoši 
Mampuru II 
Central 
Kgoši 
Mampuru II 
Local 
Remand 
Detention 
2012/13 27.373 80.158 30.690 138.221 
2013/14 8.364 62.139 16.284 86.787 
2014/15 26.664 80.265 122.846 229.775 
Projected 
weight for 
2015/16 
20.091 74.294 148.763 243.148 
 
The trends in the extent of confiscated dagga for the three Correctional Centres 
individually and in total are displayed in graph 4.2: 
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Graph 4.2: Trends for the total kilograms of dagga confiscated for the 
Correctional Centres Johannesburg Medium B, Kgoši Mampuru II Central and 
Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention individually and in total for the 3 
financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15, and projected for 2015/16 
 
The following trends are observed for each of the three Correctional Centres as 
displayed in Graph 4.2: 
 A marginal downward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a marginal 
upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Johannesburg 
Medium B Correctional Centre, with a marginal downward trend projected for 
the 2015/16 financial year; 
 A marginal downward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a marginal 
upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Kgoši 
Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre, with a marginal downward trend 
projected for the 2015/16 financial year; 
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 A marginal downward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14 with a steep upward 
trend between 2013/14 and 2014/15, is observed for Kgoši Mampuru II Local 
Remand Detention Centre, with a gradual upward trend projected for the 
2015/16 financial year; 
The kilograms of dagga confiscated for the three Correctional Centres in total as 
displayed in Graph 4.2, indicates a steep downward trend between the 2012/13 and 
2013/14 financial years with a steep upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 
financial years and a marginal upward trend projected between the 2014/15 and the 
2015/16 financial years. 
 
(iii) Cellular gadgets 
The extent of the number of confiscated cell phones and SIM cards per Correctional 
Centre individually and in total are displayed in Tables 4.8and 4.9. A forecast (based 
on the actual numbers for the financial year 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15) of the 
number of confiscated cell phones and SIM cards foreseen for the 2015/16 are also 
portrayed in Tables 4.8and 4.9.  The FORECAST function in Microsoft Excel is used 
to calculate the projected values for the 2015/16 financial year. 
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Table 4.8: Actual number of cell phones confiscated during the financial years 
2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 and a forecast of the number of cell phones 
projected to be confiscated during the 2015/16 financial year, per Correctional 
Centre and in total.  
Financial Year Number of other cell phones 
confiscated/projected per Correctional Centre 
Total 
number of 
other 
weapons 
confiscated 
/ projected 
Johannesburg 
Med B 
Kgoši 
Mampuru II 
Central 
Kgoši 
Mampuru II 
Local 
Remand 
Detention 
2012/13 504 701 147 1352 
2013/14 1463 393 132 1988 
2014/15 1349 1551 280 3180 
Projected 
number for 
2015/16 
1950 1732 319 4001 
 
The trends in the extent of confiscated cell phones for the three Correctional Centres 
individually and in total are displayed in graph 4.3. 
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Graph 4.3: Trends for the confiscated number of cell phones for the Correctional 
Centres Johannesburg Medium B, Kgoši Mampuru II Central and Kgoši 
Mampuru II Local Remand Detention individually and in total, for the 3 financial 
years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15, and projected for 2015/16 
 
The following trends are observed for each of the three Correctional Centres as 
displayed in Graph 4.3: 
 A steep upward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a marginal 
downward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for 
Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre, with a gradual upward trend 
projected for the 2015/16 financial year; 
 A marginal downward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a steep 
upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Kgoši 
Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre, with a marginal upward trend 
projected for the 2015/16 financial year; 
 A steady trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a marginal upward trend 
between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Kgoši Mampuru II Local 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Pojected
2015/16
Johannesburg Med B
Kgoši Mampuru II Central
Kgoši Mampuru II Local
Remand Detention
Total
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT 
SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG. 
 
80 
 
Remand Detention Centre, with a marginal upward trend projected for the 
2015/16 financial year; 
The number of cell phones confiscated for the three Correctional Centres in total as 
displayed in Graph 4.3, indicates a steady upward trend between the 2012/13 and 
2013/14 financial years with a steep upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 
financial years and a steep upward trend I projected between the 2014/15 and the 
2015/16 financial years. 
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Table 4.9: Actual number of SIM card confiscated during the financial years 
2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 and a forecast of the number of SIM card projected 
to be confiscated during the 2015/16 financial year, per Correctional Centre and 
in total.  
Financial 
Year 
Number of SIM cards confiscated/projected per 
Correctional Centre 
Total number 
of SIM cards 
confiscated / 
projected 
Johannesburg 
Med B 
Kgoši 
Mampuru II 
Central 
Kgoši 
Mampuru II 
Local 
Remand 
Detention 
2012/13 523 758 274 1555 
2013/14 1335 557 170 2062 
2014/15 1688 1629 309 3626 
Projected 
number for 
2015/16 
2347 1852 286 4485 
 
The trends in the number of confiscated SIM cards for the three Correctional Centres 
individually and in total are displayed in graph 4.4. 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT 
SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG. 
 
82 
 
 
Graph 4.4: Trends for the confiscated number of SIM card for the Correctional 
Centres Johannesburg Medium B, Kgoši Mampuru II Central and Kgoši 
Mampuru II Local Remand Detention individually and in total, for the 3 financial 
years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15, and projected for 2015/16 
The following trends are observed for each of the three Correctional Centres as 
displayed in Graph 4.1 above: 
The following trends are observed for each of the three Correctional Centres as 
displayed in Graph 4.3: 
 A gradual upward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a marginal upward 
trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Johannesburg Medium 
B Correctional Centre, with a gradual upward trend projected for the 2015/16 
financial year; 
 A marginal downward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a gradual 
upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Kgoši 
Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre, with a marginal upward trend 
projected for the 2015/16 financial year; 
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 A relative steady horizontal trend is observed for Kgoši Mampuru II Local 
Remand Detention Centre for the 3–year period, with a steady horizontal trend 
projected for the 2015/16 financial year; 
The number of SIM cards confiscated for the three Correctional Centres in total as 
displayed in Graph 4.4, indicates a steady upward trend between the 2012/13 and 
2013/14 financial years with a steep upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 
financial years and a steep upward trend I projected between the 2014/15 and the 
2015/16 financial years. 
 
(iv) Cash confiscated 
The extent of the amount of cash confiscated per Correctional Centre individually and 
in total is displayed in Table 4.10. A forecast (based on the actual numbers for the 
financial year 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15) of the amount of cash foreseen to be 
confiscated for the 2015/16 is also portrayed in Table 4.9 below.  The FORECAST 
function in Microsoft Excel is used to calculate the projected value. 
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Table 4.10: Actual amount of money confiscated during the financial years 
2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 and a forecast of the number of ‘other dangerous 
weapons’ projected to be confiscated during the 2015/16 financial year, per 
Correctional Centre and in total. 
Financial Year Actual amount (Rand value) of cash 
confiscated/projected per Correctional Centre 
Total cash 
confiscated 
/ projected 
Johannesburg 
Med B 
Kgoši 
Mampuru II 
Central 
Kgoši 
Mampuru II 
Local Remand 
Detention 
2012/13 17056 363 1156 18575 
2013/14 16907 310 8386 25603 
2014/15 15744 149 4567 20460 
Projected 
value for 
2015/16 
15257 60 8114 23431 
 
The trends in the extent of the cash amount confiscated for the three Correctional 
Centres individually and in total are displayed in graph 4.5 below 
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Graph 4.5: Trends for the amount of cash confiscated for the Correctional 
Centres Johannesburg Medium B, Kgoši Mampuru II Central and Kgoši 
Mampuru II Local Remand Detention individually and in total for the 3 financial 
years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15, and projected for 2015/16 
 
The following trends are observed for each of the three Correctional Centres as 
displayed in Graph 4.5 above: 
 A marginal downward trend is observed for Johannesburg Medium B 
Correctional Centre for the 3-year period, with a marginal downward trend 
projected for the 2015/16 financial year; 
 A steady horizontal trend is observed for Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional 
Centre for the 3-year period, with a steady horizontal trend projected for the 
2015/16 financial year; 
 An gradual upward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a gradual 
downward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Kgoši 
Mampuru II Local Remand Detention Centre, with a marginal upward trend 
projected for the 2015/16 financial year; 
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The amount of cash confiscated for the three Correctional Centres in total as 
displayed in Graph 4.5, indicates a steady upward trend between the 2012/13 and 
2013/14 financial years with a steady downward trend between the 2013/14 and 
2014/15 financial years and a gradual upward trend projected for the 2015/16 financial 
year. 
 
4.3 MULTI-DIMENSIONAL CHALLENGES THAT ARE CENTRAL TO 
UPHOLDING SECURITY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL 
SERVICES 
Because of operational challenges that correctional officials and management are 
faced with, it is not possible to search every cell or unit every day. It is for this reason 
that the researcher believes that all unauthorised items found inside cells or units went 
through the main gates of a correctional centre. Although correctional officials are 
doing all in their power to eradicate smuggling of unauthorised items in correctional 
centres, there are contributory factors to this phenomenon of smuggling. These 
contributory factors are discussed in more details below: 
 
4.3.1 12 HOUR SHIFT 
Correctional officials that are working with offenders, have to do a 12 hours shift per 
day which starts from 06:00 - 1800, working with offenders demands that a person 
should always be on the alert and ready to deal with any challenge that an offender 
may bring. Offenders have plenty of time to plan and execute their preposterous of 
smuggling. The twelve hour long shift is counterproductive and impacting negatively 
on officials’ concentration span and alertness levels. 
4.3.2 SEVEN DAYS ESTABLISHMENT 
The introduction of the Seven Days Establishment policy brought with a huge of 
shortage of staff in correctional centres and is also contributing to deficiency of 
security that contributes to unauthorised items finding their ways into the correctional 
centres. Seven days establishment works as follows: 
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Week 1 = four (4) days IN and three (3) OFF  
Week 2 = three (3) IN and four (4) days OFF  
In a unit that has 10 officials with ± 500 offenders. Those officials are further divided 
into 5 officials per A and B division respectively whereas the number of offenders 
remains 500 on daily basis. Meaning that officials on ‘A’ division will not work on the 
same day with officials on ‘B’ division due to the Seven Days establishment.  This 
system is deprives Department of Correctional Services of officials that can strengthen 
security and have a power to deal with smuggling. The more officials we have in 
correctional centres the easier we can deal with smuggling. 
 
4.3.3 CATEGORIES OF CORRECTIONAL OFFICIALS 
Resolution no 1 of 2007 Occupation Specific Dispensation (OSD) for Correctional 
Services Officials’ intention was to reinforce service delivery in a correctional facility, 
however one sees some gaps that are created by this resolution. This resolution 
categorises correctional officials into two namely Centre - Based and Non- Centre - 
Based. This approach is dividing correctional officials with reference to their OSD. For 
the Department of Correctional Services to win this fight against smuggling of 
unauthorised items into correctional centres, it needs correctional officials that are 
united towards a common goal which is to ensure safety and security of all the people 
and property. 
4.3.3.1  Centre - Based Correctional staff 
 Centre – Based correctional staff includes all employees who are employed at 
Department of Correctional Services and fall within the following work streams of the 
Occupation Specific Dispensation in Category A (45 hour work week) Security.  
a) Corrections (Case Management / Social Re-integration).  
b) Management of Correctional Centre and Community Corrections. 
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4.3.3.2 Non- Centre - Based correctional staff 
Non- Centre - Based correctional staff all employees who are not categorised as 
Centre - Based correctional staff, who shall operate as Category B (40 hour work 
week): 
 
This means that from the ±42000 officials we have ± 21000 officials that are Centre - 
Based and the remaining total that is Non -Centre - Based. The Centre - Based 
officials are receiving training that prepares them in dealing with offenders and 
smuggling.  
 
On the other hand the non- Centre - Based are not trained in dealing with offenders, 
whereas their qualification or trade and the fact that they are working in the 
Correctional environment they always deal with offenders, it can be an offender that is 
working in their office doing the cleaning work. Monitors that are rendering some type 
of labour or offenders in a workshop doing some trade that is rendered by the Non- 
Centre - Based officials who are artisans also inter act with non–Centre-Based staff, 
offenders receiving counselling by psychologist or social worker, this category of 
officials are also playing a pivotal role in the rehabilitation of offenders in rendering 
care, development and training to offenders. This category officials are not salaried 
the same as  Centre - Based officials and they have the propensity to turn a blind eye 
on issues of security, because they are not regarded as security officials and this is 
the number that is missing in effecting security. 
 
By categorising correctional officials into centre and non- Centre - Based officials this 
system is contributing to the division within Department of Correctional Services where 
correctional officials are within their ranks treating each other as them and us. When 
one needs a stronger force to deal with smuggling and smugglers we need to create a 
unified force which is identified as correctional officer with same benefits and same 
purpose that will contribute to the believe system and a sense of belonging to the 
community of correctional services. This phenomenon of OSD has created a crack in 
the system that weakens security and feeds the habit of smuggling.  
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4.3.4 OVERCROWDING OF OFFENDERS 
The Department of Correctional Services has 243 correctional centres with a total 
155000 offenders in a space that is designed to accommodate 118154 offenders. This 
means that the department is overpopulated by 32%. When comparing against 21000 
correctional officials who are categorised as Centre-Based, it gives us the ratio 1/562 
offenders.  
 
If one can add the other 21000 correctional officials who are non- Centre – Based to 
the above total, the ratio would improve almost by half.  And this could enhance the 
fight against smuggling in correctional centres, it is clear that Department of 
Correctional Services needs all its employees to be trained and equipped to contribute 
to its core business, namely; safety and security as well as rehabilitation of offenders. 
 
4.3.5 THE OPERATIONAL PRACTICES AND FREQUENCY OF SEARCHES 
Lastly, because of the shortage that is explained above together with other operational 
challenges such as number of officials against number of offenders in a unit.  The 
information gathered in this report shows that at Kgoši Mampuru II Central which is 
having 10 units the researcher can reveal that from the collected data, at most on the 
day when searching was conducted only one unit or one cell was searched, which 
strongly suggest that if all the units and cells were searched daily more unauthorised 
items would have been confiscated, because of shortage of officials. There were only 
five correctional officials during the day shift in a unit of approximately five - hundred 
(500) offenders. Offenders need to be escorted internally from one office to next to 
receive their support services including health care and social work services. 
 
Activities of a Correctional Official in a Unit: 
 Locking and unlocking. 
 Inspection of cells. 
 Counting offenders. 
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 Hygiene parade 
 Serving of meals: three times a day. 
 One on one interaction with offenders. 
 Taking complaints and request of offenders. 
 Escort offenders internally to/from one office to the next for various needs, e.g. 
development, care, and so on. 
 Escort offenders externally to court or public hospitals. 
 Man the entrance gate. 
 Officials will be responsible for the patrolling and maintenance of order in the 
unit. 
 In between all those activities officials must remain vigilant and conduct 
searching and removal of smuggled unauthorised items. 
 
4.3.6 DOCUMENTATION OF CONFISCATED UNAUTHORISED ITEMS 
Documentation of confiscated items is recorded differently not all correctional centres 
are having a uniform recording system hence it was a challenge to determine the 
value of dagga that was confiscated. We found that some of the dagga registered as 
blades, some registered as bank size packages. As a result, the researcher was 
compelled to estimate the value of the above after measuring each of the items. And it 
must be noted that packaging of such items will not always reflect the same weight 
because also the people packaging these items do not weigh them.  
Some days had nothing registered, meaning that searching was not conducted on the 
particular day. 
 
4.4 AREAS THAT ARE IDENTIFIED AS THE CENTRAL NERVE FOR 
SMUGGLING. 
Most searching at the points of entry into the centre is conducted by means of the 
following methods: 
 Pad down searching and 
  Visual probing. 
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These two methods are effortlessly intruded by the smugglers. Electronic scanners 
are at most not used due to lack of scanners. The smuggler conceals items in such a 
way that a naked eye will have difficulty in discovering them. 
 
The areas that are identified by the researcher as central nerves for smuggling in a 
correctional centre are:  
o Main gates to the correctional centre. 
o Delivery gates 
o Workshops 
o Kitchen  
o Visitors area 
Mainly those areas do not have scanners that can detect unauthorised items that are 
concealed in the delivery trucks, body cavity, containers, and food parcels. 
. 
4.4.1 THE NATURE OF THE ACTIONS TAKEN AGAINST THE PERPETRATOR. 
4.4.1.1 Offender as a perpetrator 
The following corrective measures can be implemented against an offender: 
o He/she can be reprimanded, 
o Lose his/her gratuity for a period not exceeding one month. 
o Restricted amenities for a period not exceeding seven days. 
o Be segregated to undergo certain programmes. 
4.4.1.2 Public member as a perpetrator 
Public member he/ she can be charged criminally. Department of Correctional 
Services can restrict him/her from entering a correctional centre where he has 
transgressed. It must be noted that such people are able to visit another correctional 
centre and continue their illegal practice without being detected. 
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4.4.1.3 Correctional official as a perpetrator 
He or she can be charged departmentally and criminally. He may be subjected to a 
disciplinary process which can ultimately result in dismissal. 
 
All the penalties as outlined above seem not to be deterrent enough to discourage 
perpetrators from engaging in smuggling activities.  
 
4.4.2 SEIZURE OF UNAUTHORISED ITEMS 
All unauthorised items recovered during a search of a body cavity or orifice or any 
other seizure must be recorded in the prescribed register marked "Confiscation 
Register ". The items must be handed to the investigating officer where disciplinary 
procedures will be facilitated to serve as exhibits during the enquiry. 
 
In the case where money has been retrieved, a receipt number must be entered into 
the said register as well as the manner in which it was disposed of. 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The study was set out to analyse the nature, extent and causes of smuggling at the 
selected correctional centres in Gauteng. The rationale for this study was to make a 
scientific description and associated findings and recommendations against the 
investigation supra. The approach to the findings will be positivistic as described by 
Vold (1958:4) this study has also sought to know the nature of unauthorised items that 
are mostly smuggled into these centres, it also sought to know the extent and causes 
of smuggling unauthorised items into the correctional centres, which disrupts order 
and security.  
 
The range of unauthorised items involved in smuggling within correctional centres are 
amongst others: money, that is seen as a frequent distributor of all the nuisance of 
smuggling; drugs, which are regarded as illegal, unauthorised, habit-forming and are 
stupefying; weapons, such as fire-arms and explosives which are the deadliest 
instruments used by offenders in any escape activity; other dangerous weapons such 
as knives are used for gang related and escapes activities.Cellular phones are also 
unauthorised items that are dangerous in a correctional centres’ environment. This is 
because they allow offenders to bypass regulations and conduct illicit activity from 
behind bars. 
 
The security risks involved in smuggling result in disrespect of order and security of 
the correctional centre. Activities such as vandalism of the structures of correctional 
centres are carried out to protect and enhance smuggling activities. Violence becomes 
high due to the problem of smuggled items. Assault and death are common during 
smuggling. Offenders assault and kill one another and officials for or with unauthorised 
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items that they have smuggled into the correctional centres. Smuggling accelerates 
the rate of escapes. 
 
There were many unauthorised items that were smuggled into the three selected 
correctional centres for the financial year 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15. For the 
financial year 2012/13 there were 0 firearm, 1 bullet, 3428 other dangerous weapons 
and explosives confiscated. Drugs confiscated for the same financial were as follows: 
98 Nyaope incidents, 36 Mandrax tablet incidents, 454.783kg dagga (see Table 4.5 in 
Chapter 4). Cell phones confiscated were 6520. Cash to the value of R64638 was also 
confiscated. Given the above statistics, it is clear that offenders have creative and 
illusive methods of hiding unauthorised items, whereby ordinary searching methods 
are unable to detect unauthorised items at the points of entry to the correctional 
centres. It is also evident that these unauthorised items are not only introduced into 
the correctional centres by offenders, but also by people such as corrupt correctional 
officials, service providers and visitors that are entering the correctional centre through 
the point of entry to the correctional centre which are the main gates. 
 
The statistics above gives an indication that Pat-down searches of the clothed body 
were not thoroughly conducted. Searches involving the removal of clothing and 
electronic searching were commonly not conducted as a result of a lack of electronic 
devices. Pad down searching method and visual probing are effortlessly infringed by 
the smugglers. Electronic scanners are not available in most South African 
correctional centres. The smugglers conceal items in such a way that a naked eye will 
have difficulty in discovering them. 
 
Given the above statistics, it was evident that smuggling operation involves more 
specialised tasks which are the transportation plan, recruitment plan, procument plan 
of unauthorised items to be smuggled, bribing security officials, payment of collectors. 
The act of smuggling should be categorised as an organised crime activity. 
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Because of poor documentation of data with regard to smuggling activities, the people 
that are smuggling items into correctional centres are able to smuggle an item for 
instance to Kgoši Mampuru Central II Local CC and be apprehended while the same 
person again smuggle other items to Johannesburg Correctional Centre without being 
detected or refused entry. 
There are several contrabutary factors to the problem of smuggling of unauthorised 
items into the correctional centres. The factors found are amongst others, 
overcrowding which is a reality, overcrowding of offenders also nourishes the problem 
of smuggling. 
 
The introduction of the seven days establishment in the Department of Correctional 
Services has brought about a negative output into the phenomenon of smuggling. The 
Seven Days Establishment policy is depriving the Department of Correctional Services 
of officials that can strengthen security and have strength to deal with smuggling. The 
more officials we have in correctional centres the easier we can deal with smuggling. 
 
The new dispensation of categorising correctional officials into Occupational Specific 
Dispensation has created Centre-Base and Non - Centre - Based officials.  
 
Inconsistency in capturing the data with reference to confiscation registers is also a 
smuggling contributory factor. It was found that the Department does not have a 
standardised searching register and a global computer system.– The Confiscation 
registers of the three correctional centres under study had different headings. 
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5.2 FINDINGS 
5.2.1 No electronic scanners in most correctional centres. 
5.2.2 Unauthorised items are transported into correctional centres by offenders, 
public visitors and corrupt officials. 
5.2.3 Money is at the centre of smuggling in correctional centres. 
5.2.4 Several Department of Correctional Services Policies are contributing to the 
problem at hand; 
5.2.4.1 12 hour shift. 
5.2.4.2 Seven days establishment. 
5.2.4.3 Occupation Specific Dispensation. 
5.2.4.4 Overcrowding increasing the burden. 
5.2.4.5 Shortage of staff to perform to perform daily activities. 
5.2.5 Inconsistency in capturing data regarding unauthorised items confiscated 
per correctional centre. 
5.2.6 The main gate is the entry point for nearly all unauthorised items. 
5.2.7 Smuggling is the work of involving criminal syndicates. Therefore it must be 
seen for what it is - organised crime. 
 
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
(The use of must in some instance is a peremptory obligation). 
5.3.1 ENTRANCE GATES AND ELECTRONIC SCANNARS 
The entrance gate into a correctional centre should have electronic scanners that can 
be used to detect unauthorised items that may be concealed in the body oracles and 
containers. People entering or leaving a correctional centre must be thoroughly 
searched. The use of cell phone detection devices should be introduced 
. 
5.3.2 ACCESS CONTROL UNIT 
Main gates are the reflection of the security of the correctional centre, if corrupt 
officials are placed at such important gates. More unauthorised items will be found 
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inside the correctional centre. The practice of placing officials at such gates as a form 
of punishment must be discouraged. There is a strong need for a creation of Access 
Control Unit with strong team of officials that has good ethical values, this type of 
officials must be selected for the main gate posts; the post must have incentives for 
promotion. More emphases must be given to the main gate management. That will be 
headed by an Assistant Director who will subsequently report to Area Coordinator 
Corrections, with a staff complement that will have at least two male and two female 
officials with a rank of Correctional Officer Grade I per shift of eight hours a day. One 
Senior Correctional Official who will be a supervisor. All this officials must receive 
specialised access control management training, with more emphasis to confidentially, 
Safety and Security. 
 
5.3.3 MONEY AND UNAUTHORISED ITEMS 
Money must not be allowed to go through the security check point in to the 
correctional centre. No person including correctional officials must be allowed to enter 
a correctional centre with money or any unauthorised item. Each correctional centre 
must have safes that are mounted in officials’ rest rooms. Money that is intended for 
the payment of fines and bails must be collected at a designated area by officials 
authorised to handle such moneys. 
 
5.3.4 8 HOURS SHIFT REPLACING 7 DAYS ESTABLISHMENT 
Seven days establishment should be replaced. The Twelve-hour shift is also a 
contributing factor to smuggling in that officials that are working with offenders’ are 
working 12 hours a day, the shift starts from 06:00 until 18:00, working with offenders 
demand a person whose body and soul are ready to deal with any challenge that an 
offender will bring. Offenders have abundance of time to plan and execute their 
preposterous plans that contribute to smuggling. This long hour shift is impacting on 
the concentration of such officials in dealing with smuggling The Department should 
introduce the three shift system of 8 hour working shift, this shift will improve 
availability of officials to deal with the problems of security that are resultant of 
smuggling. 
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5.3.5 CORRECTIONAL SERVICES AS A CENTRE-BASED ORGANISATION 
All the officials of the Department of Correctional Services must be classified and 
trained in security matters as correctional officials regardless of the type of service that 
they are rendering. The current OSD has created a division that is impacting heavily 
on the core business of the Department which is security. Centre-Based and Non-
Centre – Based classification should be discontinued, regard all staff as Centre - 
Based. Non - Centre - Based officials should be incorporated and training as security 
personnel, with this strategy Department of Correctional Services will have more 
officials that are dealing with security matters and a fight against smuggling. 
 
5.3.6 RELEASE STRATEGY AS A TOOL TO DOWN MANAGE OVERCROWDING 
Overcrowding of offenders must be down managed by effectively managing the 
release strategy. Availability of documents such as SAPS62 (crime description), 
SAPS69 (previous convictions) and Sentence Remarks must be submitted with a 
warrant immediately on admission of the offender after sentencing by the courts. 
Procedure to complete profile report (G326) should be complied with, late submission 
of profile report must be discouraged. The following document must be available.  
 Development programmes must be attached. 
 Correctional programmes must be attached. 
 Judges remarks must be attached. 
 Full details regarding escapes must be attached e.g. date escaped and date re-
admitted and days served before escape. 
 Bail pending appeal information must be furnished e.g. date released and date 
re admitted and days served before bail pending appeal. 
 Offender exposure to Restorative justice and such intervention must be 
attached. Victim offender dialogue (VOD) and Victim offender mediation (VOM) 
are imperative. 
 Social workers vocational report must be attached. 
 Psychologist vocational report must be attached. 
 Medical history must be attached. 
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 Effective sentence is either incorrect or omitted. 
 SAPS62 must be attached. 
 SAPS69(c) must be attached. 
 Disciplinary offences must be attached and properly defined on prescribed 
disciplinary offence form (G363A) 
 Registration numbers and names of accomplices must be furnished.  
The Head Correctional Centre must ensure that profile reports are completed correctly 
and the above mentioned factors are accounted for, no late submission of profiles: 
Correctional Services B Order 1, Chapter 26 paragraph 37.2.1. 
 
5.3.7 RIGOROUS ADDRESS TO SHORTAGE OF STAFF 
Shortage of staff is a challenge that must be rigorously addressed. Safety and Security 
is the core business of the DCS and is essentially people-driven. Four Pronged 
Approach to shortage of officials: 
1. Appoint learners immediately into system after they have succeeded in the 
interview and there after they may undergo training.  
2. Discontinue the OSD of Non-Centre based and train all officials in security 
matters.  
3. Shift from 7 days establishment to 3 shifts of 8 hours a day,  
4. Correctional Officials that are working at National Head Office, Regional Offices 
and Management Area’s offices should work weekend and holidays at the 
correctional centres. 
 
5.3.8 GLOBAL SYSTEM OF CAPTURING CONFISCATED ITEMS  
A uniform and a global computer system of capturing Confiscated items must be 
introduced, which will reflect the perpetrators identity and information, the item 
smuggled, where was it hidden (in order to quantify and analyse the hot areas). In this 
system the information is immediately circulated to the other correctional centres 
around the Department of Correctional Services. 
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5.3.9 SMUGGLING AS AN ORGANISED CRIME 
Pragmatically smuggling is the work of involving criminal syndicates. Therefore it must be 
seen for what it is - organised crime. The security risks such as loss of life, vandalism of 
the structures of correctional centres are carried out to protect and enhance smuggling 
activities. High rate of escapes from lawful custody, disregard for order and security in 
correctional centres and in general security of the nation, the act of smuggling must be 
classified as an organised crime with a heavy sentence being instituted on the 
perpetrators. Because smuggling is an organised act, all the security clusters should 
work together in a fight against smuggling. The involvement of NIA is pivotal. 
 
5.3.10 PROMOTION POLICY FOR PRODUCTION WORKERS 
There is no promotion policy for Correctional Officials on Grades III, II and I whereby 
good and competent officials are lost along the way because they are not motivated 
through promotions. DCS should consider a promotion policy in order to enhance the 
moral of production officials.  
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